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Sami Salim Mohammed Hammed var en 23 år gammel dropout fra Jenin. I avskjedsvideoen avleverer han standardbudskapet, også at «vi elsker døden like mye som dere elsker livet». Det er den mest forferdelige setning som er ytret i vår tid, og dens far er ayatollah Khomeini. Sami Salim Mohammed Hammed er hans barn.

Det er helt feil det norske forståsegpåere som Hilde Henriksen Waage og en rekke andre sier: at selvmordsaksjonene springer ut av desperasjon og fortvilelse. Jeg tror snarere at det kan være mange andre palestinere som er minst like desperate, men de sprenger seg ikke selv i lufta. Årsaken til denne modus operandi ligger ikke i the human condition på Vestbredden og Gaza, den ligger i hjertet til Khomeini.

Allerede under den iranske revolusjonen begynte islamistene å benytte selvmordsaksjoner som våpen, og slagordene gjenspeilte det som er deres budskap: Vi elsker Døden.

På veggen til den amerikanske ambassaden var det malt med store bokstaver i 1980; JO MER VI DØR, DESTO STERKERE BLIR VI!

Dette er islamismens gave til menneskeheten, liksom nazismen skjenket oss Auschwitz og bolsjevikene Homo Sovieticus og Gulag.

Da Saddam Hussein angrep Iran, og sørget for at islamistene kunne knuse all opposisjon og islamisere samfunnet totalt, dukket et nytt slagord opp på gatene:

DENNE KRIGEN ER EN STOR VELSIGNELSE FOR OSS!

Men kanskje ikke for de titusener av guttunger som Khomeini sendte i døden med løfte om å komme direkte til paradis?

En ting er myten om slaget ved Karbala og imam Husseins død, og flagellantopptogene på Ashura-dagen. Khomeini tar denne tradisjonen og former den på en måte som gjør den til noe annet.

According to Khomeini, life is worthless and death is the beginning of genuine existence. «The natural world,» he explained in October 1980, «is the lowest element, the scum of creation. «What is decisive is the beyond: The «divine world, that is eternal.» This latter world is accessible to martyrs. Their death is no death, but merely the transition from this world to the world beyond, where they will live on eternally and in splendor. Whether the warrior wins the battle or loses it and dies a Martyr–in both cases, his victory is assured: either a mundane or a spiritual one.

En ting er å betrakte den materielle verden som et skinne, uvesentlig. Noe annet er å si at livet er dritt. Da snakker vi om noe annet enn spiritualitet.

Det er Matthias Küntzel som gjennomgår Mahmoud Ahmadinejads bakgrunn i en artikkel i siste New Republic.

Ahmadinjad er vokst opp som revolusjonens sønn, og har vært med å starte Den Andre Revolusjon. Det er det de kaller det. For Ahmadinejad er det bare Khamenei, Den øverste, som teller. Gud vet hvilke planer de måtte ha. I en dokumentar Arte viste, sa Khamenei at målet var en islamisering av hele verden, til syvende og sist.

Khomeini lånte fra flere, bl.a. fra sunni Muslimske Brorskapet i Egypt, i deres syn på moderniteten.

This activism had more in common with the revolutionary ideas of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood than with Shia traditions. Khomeini had been familiar with the texts of the Muslim Brothers since the 1930s, and he agreed with the Brothers’ conception of what had to be considered «evil»: namely, all the achievements of modernity that replaced divine providence with individual self-determination, blind faith with doubt, and the stern morality of sharia with sensual pleasures.

Kampen mot moderniteten er et hoveddrag ved islamismen, liksom den ogå var det ved den reaksjonære høyreradikalismen som endte med den konservative revolusjon i Tyskland; nazismen.

These children who rolled to their deaths were part of the Basiji, a mass movement created by Khomeini in 1979 and militarized after the war started in order to supplement his beleaguered army.The Basij Mostazafan–or «mobilization of the oppressed»–was essentially a volunteer militia, most of whose members were not yet 18. They went enthusiastically, and by the thousands, to their own destruction. «The young men cleared the mines with their own bodies,» one veteran of the Iran-Iraq War recalled in 2002 to the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine. «It was sometimes like a race. Even without the commander’s orders, everyone wanted to be first.»

Fenomenet med ungene som styrter mot minefeltene med plastikknøkler til paradis rundt halsen, er en gjenganger, og ses på et uutgrunnelig tegn på fanatisk tro. Men noen manipulerte disse ungene til å ofre livet, og det skjedde med samme forakt som kjennetegner bakmennene til palestinske selvmordsbombere.

The sacrifice of the Basiji was ghastly. And yet, today, it is a source not of national shame, but of growing pride. Since the end of hostilities against Iraq in 1988, the Basiji have grown both in numbers and influence. They have been deployed, above all, as a vice squad to enforce religious law in Iran, and their elite «special units» have been used as shock troops against anti-government forces. In both 1999 and 2003, for instance, the Basiji were used to suppress student unrest. And, last year, they formed the potent core of the political base that propelled Mahmoud Ahmadinejad–a man who reportedly served as a Basij instructor during the Iran-Iraq War–to the presidency.

Ahmadinejad revels in his alliance with the Basiji. He regularly appears in public wearing a black-and-white Basij scarf, and, in his speeches, he routinely praises «Basij culture» and «Basij power,» with which he says «Iran today makes its presence felt on the international and diplomatic stage.» Ahmadinejad’s ascendance on the shoulders of the Basiji means that the Iranian Revolution, launched almost three decades ago, has entered a new and disturbing phase. A younger generation of Iranians, whose worldviews were forged in the atrocities of the Iran-Iraq War, have come to power, wielding a more fervently ideological approach to politics than their predecessors. The children of the Revolution are now its leaders.

En stor del av det iranske folk er grundig desillusjonert av Den islamske revolusjonen. Som Nazar Nafisi skriver; ingenting kunne kurert dem bedre mot islam enn å leve i en islamsk stat. Med Den store Satan, USA, forholder det seg på samme måte: iranerne er fascinert av USA.

Mot flertallet har Khamenei skapt en lydig, fanatisk ungdomsmilits, Basiji, som han kan lite på. De representerer en minoritet, men de har makten, og er villig til å bruke vold.

We do know that, after the war’s end, he served as the governor of Ardebil Province and as an organizer of Ansar-e Hezbollah, a radical gang of violent Islamic vigilantes. After becoming mayor of Tehran in April 2003, Ahmadinejad used his position to build up a strong network of radical Islamic fundamentalists known as Abadgaran-e Iran-e Islami, or Developers of an Islamic Iran. It was in that role that he won his reputation–and popularity–as a hardliner devoted to rolling back the liberal reforms of then-President Muhammad Khatami. Ahmadinejad positioned himself as the leader of a «second revolution» to eradicate corruption and Western influences from Iranian society. And the Basiji, whose numbers had grown dramatically since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, embraced him. Recruited from the more conservative and impoverished parts of the population, the Basiji fall under the direction of–and swear absolute loyalty to–the Supreme Leader Ali Khameini, Khomeini’s successor. During Ahmadinejad’s run for the presidency in 2005, the millions of Basiji–in every Iranian town, neighborhood, and mosque–became his unofficial campaign workers.

ince Ahmadinejad became president, the influence of the Basiji has grown. In November, the new Iranian president opened the annual «Basiji Week,» which commemorates the martyrs of the Iran-Iraq War. According to a report in Kayan, a publication loyal to Khameini, some nine million Basiji–12 percent of the Iranian population–turned out to demonstrate in favor of Ahmadinejad’s anti-liberal platform. The article claimed that the demonstrators «form[ed] a human chain some 8,700 kilometers long. … In Tehran alone, some 1,250,000 people turned out.» Barely noticed by the Western media, this mobilization attests to Ahmadinejad’s determination to impose his «second revolution» and to extinguish the few sparks of freedom in Iran.

At the end of July 2005, the Basij movement announced plans to increase its membership from ten million to 15 million by 2010. The elite special units are supposed to comprise some 150,000 people by then. Accordingly, the Basiji have received new powers in their function as an unofficial division of the police. What this means in practice became clear in February 2006, when the Basiji attacked the leader of the bus-drivers’ union, Massoud Osanlou. They held Osanlou prisoner in his apartment, and they cut off the tip of his tongue in order to convince him to keep quiet. No Basiji needs to fear prosecution for such terrorists tactics before a court of law.

På samme måte som bolsjevikene og nazistene dyrker islamistene myter som skal hylle bevegelsen, men er et forræderi mot livet: Sovjetkommunistene hyllet gutten som anga sine egne foreldre. Han ble holdt frem som forbilde for alle skoleunger! På samme måte har iranerne som ideal en liten gutt som legger seg ned foran en stridsvogn.

As Basij ideology and influence enjoy a renaissance under Ahmadinejad, the movement’s belief in the virtues of violent self-sacrifice remains intact. There is no «truth commission» in Iran to investigate the state-planned collective suicide that took place from 1980 to 1988. Instead, every Iranian is taught the virtues of martyrdom from childhood. Obviously, many of them reject the Basij teachings. Still, everyone knows the name of Hossein Fahmideh, who, as a 13-year-old boy during the war, blew himself up in front of an Iraqi tank. His image follows Iranians throughout their day: whether on postage stamps or the currency. If you hold up a 500 Rial bill to the light, it is his face you will see in the watermark. The self-destruction of Fahmideh is depicted as a model of profound faith by the Iranian press. It has been the subject of both an animated film and an episode of the TV series «Children of Paradise.» As a symbol of their readiness to die for the Revolution, Basij groups wear white funeral shrouds over their uniforms during public appearances.

During this year’s Ashura Festival, school classes were taken on excursions to a «Martyrs’ Cemetery.» «They wear headbands painted with the name Hussein,» The New York Times reported, «and march beneath banners that read: ‘Remembering the Martyrs today is as important as becoming a Martyr’ and ‘The Nation for whom Martyrdom means happiness, will always be Victorious.’ » Since 2004, the mobilization of Iranians for suicide brigades has intensified, with recruits being trained for foreign missions. Thus, a special military unit has been created bearing the name «Commando of Voluntary Martyrs. «According to its own statistics, this force has so far recruited some 52,000 Iranians to the suicidal cause. It aims to form a «martyrdom unit» in every Iranian province.

Sunday Times skrev 42.000 forrige søndag. At Iran kan ha forberedt seg på uvanlige tiltak, av typen «menneskelige bølge mot minefelt» i global målestokk, er ikke usannsynlig.

En bekymring amerikanerne har: skulle Iran få atomvåpen kunne de finne på å gi en bombe til terrorister, slik at det ville være vanskelig å si hvem som angrep. Hvor kom bomben fra? Hvem skulle USA gå til gjengjeldelse mot?

Islamsk Jihad har påtatt seg ansvaret for dagens selvmordsaksjon i Tel Aviv. Islamsk Jihad var til stede under den tre dager lange giverkonferansen for Hamas i Teheran sist uke. Islamsk Jihad blir støttet av Iran, og dagens bombe kan godt være en hilsen fra Ahmadinejad.