Pakistans bruk av militante ekstremister er noe mer enn hensynsløst og risikabelt. Pakistan spiller et så høyt spill at motparten, India og USA, ikke tør utfordre dem, da taket da kan falle ned, også over de andres hoder. Men før eller siden vil slik høyrisikospill slå feil. Taket vil falle ned.
Steve Coll kommenterer Mumbai i The New Yorker, og det han skrev i 2006 er fremdeles aktuelt.
This is because Pakistan, knowing the stakes of getting caught red-handed, has increasingly pursued its clandestine proxy war against India in Kashmir and on the Indian mainland through layers and layers of self-managing and non-state groups. The Pakistani government and its domestic Islamist proxies, including nominally peaceful charities based in Pakistan but with operations in Kashmir, almost certainly pass through money and weapons on a large scale. They do so, however, in such a way that is very difficult to trace these supplies back to the government.
Den senere tid har Pakistan forsøkt å gjøre gruppene selvhjulpne, og lokalt forankret. To indiske muslimer er arrestert etter Mumbai.
Pakistani strategy in this clandestine war has recently emphasized attempts to «indigenize» the Islamist militants operating in India. To some extent this has involved dialing back direct military, tactical supervision of Kashmiri fighters; instead, the fighters are equipped and trained to operate on their own, and even to choose their own targets. This strategy has also involved attempts to recruit from India’s large non-Kashmiri Muslim population, a small minority of which has been radicalized by the country’s longstanding religious conflict between Muslims and a Hindu majority that has produced its own fringe, radical Hindu vigilantes.
Coll gjorde i 2006 en omfattende undersøkelse av angrepet på parlamentet i New Delhi i desember 2001. Indiske forhørsmetoder kompromitterte noe av bevismaterialet. Men mer enn nok forelå til å knytte Pakistan til angrepet, indirekte.
At the same time, there could be no doubt that the attacking militants arose from—and acquired resources such as cash and weapons from—an insurgency in Kashmir that was directly aided and abetted by the Pakistani government. The evidence was detailed and convincing enough that if the offending government were, say, Iran or Syria, there would be no doubt that the United States would seek international sanctions on the basis of the file. In this case and generally, Pakistan gets a pass in Kashmir not because the evidence about its activity is weak but because the United States and Europe fear that an isolated, sanctioned Pakistan would produce destabilization and radicalization. The Pakistan Army understands this international equation thoroughly and exploits the gaps—it is careful not to expose its direct fingerprints, and yet it is brazenly persistent in pursuit of its objective of military pressure against India in Kashmir and political-military pressure on India more broadly.
Men det finnes også angrep i India som direkte kan knyttes til pakistanske myndigheter. Det er ufattelig at en atommakt kan tillate seg slik risiko-oppførsel, uten å bli satt på plass. Den indre kontrollen fungerer åpenbart ikke.
Outside of Kashmir, there are some cases of terrorism on Indian soil where Pakistani fingerprints are directly visible. An attack on the Red Fort in New Delhi seems clearly to have been carried out by affiliates of a group called Jaish-e-Muhammad which has, at least until recently, enjoyed extensive direct support from the Pakistan security agencies. Fifteen years ago, Bombay (as it was then known) was rocked by terrorist bombings masterminded by a locally-connected Muslim gangster called Ibrahim Dawood; later, Dawood found refuge in Karachi, Pakistan, and, despite many demands by the Indian government that he be surrendered to face justice, he never was.
Dette er gangsteren som India krevde utlevert etter Mumbai, men som Zardari svarte at i så fall skulle stilles for pakistansk domstol. Han har hatt 15 år på seg.