Hans Rustad 
Dore Gold, tidligere israelsk FN-ambassadør,minner i LA Times om at den grønne linjen, grensen fra 1967, ikke er noen grense, men en våpenhvilelinje. Den er identisk med våpenhvileavtalen som ble inngått mellom Israel og individuelle arabiske land på Rhodos i januar 1949.
Linjen har med andre ord ikke status som en internasjonalt anerkjent grense, det har bare grensen mot Libanon. En slik grensedragning skulle som kjent finne sted i fremtidige forhandlinger. Derfor vedtok Sikkerhetsrådet en resolusjon, 242, som sier at Israel må gi tilbake territorier, men ikke i bestemt form, dvs. alt territorium.
Fra første stund etter Seksdagerskrigen vurderte israelske politikere og militære Israels sikkerhetsbehov. Hva skulle til for å ha forsvarbare grenser? Visestatsminister Yigal Allon var sentral.
In the years following the war, the main advocate for creating new boundaries to replace the fragile lines from before 1967 was Yigal Allon, then Israel’s deputy prime minister. Allon had considerable military experience, having commanded the Palmach, the elite strike units of the Jewish forces, in the 1948 war that created Israel.
In 1976, while serving as foreign minister, Allon wrote an article for Foreign Affairs outlining the strategic logic for his position. He pointed out that the 1967 line was an armistice line from Israel’s war of independence and never intended as a final political boundary. Allon quoted the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in 1967, Arthur Goldberg, who said that the 1967 line was neither secure nor recognized. Given this background, U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, backed by both the United States and Britain, only called for «withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict» — but not from «all the territories.» The resolution also didn’t specify strict adherence to the pre-1967 line, advocating only that «secure and recognized» boundaries be established.
Allon ble fadder til den kjente Allon-planen, bygget på Israels sikkerhetsbehov. Denne analysen er like aktuell i dag, hevder Gold. Fremfor alt må Israel kontrollere Jordan-dalen.
Under the Allon plan, Israel would include much of the Jordan Valley within its border. This area is not within the pre-1967 line, but it is essential to Israel’s defense. Because it rises from an area that was roughly 1,200 feet below sea level up a steep incline to mountaintops that are 2,000 to 3,000 feet above sea level, it serves as a formidable line of defense that would enable a small Israeli force to hold off much large conventional armies, giving Israel time to mobilize its reserves. Control of the Jordan Valley also allowed Israel to prevent the smuggling of the same kind of weaponry to the West Bank that has been entering the Gaza Strip: rockets, antiaircraft missiles and tons of explosives for terrorist attacks.
Kontroll med disse områdene har kostet Israel dyrt. Israel gambler ikke med sin sikkerhet. Et eller annet arrangement må foreligge for Jordan-dalen. Det er også vanskelig å se for seg at Israel gir tilbake Golan.
Israeli vulnerability has regional implications. Should it become clear that the great Jordan Valley barrier that protected Israel for more than 40 years is no longer in Israeli hands, then the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will become an increasingly attractive forward position for jihadi groups seeking to link up with Hamas to wage war against Israel. In 2007, when Al Qaeda activity in Iraq was at its height, the organization sought to build up a forward position in Irbid, Jordan, to recruit West Bank Palestinians. This effort was scuttled. But if Israel is back on the 1967 line, then the whole dynamic of regional security will change and the internal pressures on Jordan will undoubtedly increase.
Yitzhak Rabin holdt en tale en måned før han ble drept der han skisserte hva som bør være Israels grenser i en fremtidig avtale.
Denne historien bør også interessere Norge, for Rabin sa dette i en tale til Knesset der han ba nasjonalforsamlingen godkjenne den midlertidige Oslo II-avtalen.
Yitzhak Rabin, who promoted the Oslo agreements in 1993, understood better than anyone Israel’s strategic dilemmas in the years that followed. In October 1995, one month before he was assassinated, he addressed the Knesset and asked it to ratify the Oslo II interim agreement, which he had just signed at the White House in the presence of President Clinton. In his speech, he laid out how he saw the future borders of Israel. He made clear that Israel would not withdraw to the 1967 line. He insisted on keeping Jerusalem united. And finally, like his mentor Yigal Allon, Rabin stressed that Israel would hold on to the Jordan Valley «in the widest sense of that term.»
Norsk politikk tar utgangspunkt i moralisme: okkupasjon er forkastelig og må fordømmes og oppheves. Men ingen har rett til å be et annet land begå selvmord.
Norge har en historie i fredsprosessen som burde tilsi større bevissthet om Israels behov, og historikken. Men politikken er redusert til moralsk fordømming.
Slik har Norge spilt seg selv ut over sidelinjen.
