Egyp­terne for­tje­ner sym­pati for sine øns­ker om fri­het og demo­krati. Men det blan­der seg falske stem­mer i koret. En av dem er ElBa­radei, som har full back­ing fra Det mus­limske bror­skap.

Det bør ikke over­raske at ElBa­radei ikke har noe vondt å si om Bror­ska­pet, men tvert­imot for­sva­rer det. Alt­for mange jour­na­lis­ter tror ham. Del­vis fordi det fin­nes en god del aka­de­mi­kere i Ves­ten som ufar­lig­gjør Bror­ska­pet på samme måte, i Norge folk som Kari Vogt og Bjørn Olav Utvik.

ElBa­radei har nylig kom­met med noen utta­lel­ser om Bror­ska­pet som er for drøye. Barry Rubin tar dem for seg:

If ElBa­radei Can’t Tell the Truth About the Mus­lim Brot­her­hood, He Can’t Mas­ter It

By Barry Rubin

Muham­mad ElBa­radei bla­tantly lied to CNN. Natu­rally, the repor­ter neit­her cal­led him on it or followed up to ascer­tain the truth.

Here he is tal­king about the Mus­lim Brot­her­hood

ELBARADEI: “This is a myth that was sold by the Muba­rak regime, that it’s eit­her us, the ruth­less dicta­tors, or above them the al-Qaida types.

You know, the Mus­lim Brot­her­hood has not­hing to do with the Ira­nian model, has not­hing to do with extre­mism, as we have seen it in Afgha­ni­stan and other places. The Mus­lim Brot­her­hood is a reli­giously con­ser­va­tive group. They are a minority in Egypt. They are not a majority of the Egyp­tian people, but they have a lot of cre­di­bi­lity because all the other libe­ral par­ties have been smot­he­red for 30 years.

ANNONSE

They are in favor of a federa­list state. They are in favor of a wor­ding on the base of con­sti­tu­tion that has red lines that every Egyp­tian has the same rights, same obli­ga­tion, that the state in no way will be a state based on reli­gion. And I have been reaching out to them. We need to include them. They are part of the Egyp­tian society, as much as the Marx­ist party here. I think this myth that has been per­pe­tua­ted and sold by the regime has no – has no iota of rea­lity.”

Let’s count the lies –and Elba­radei knew he was lying, though he used tricky argu­ments to cir­cle around the blue whale in the room, his Mus­lim Brot­her­hood ally:

1. The Mus­lim Brot­her­hood has not­hing to do with the Ira­nian model, has not­hing to do with extre­mism, as we have seen it in Afgha­ni­stan and other places.

Obviously, the Brot­her­hood is not a clone of the Tali­ban or Aya­tol­lah Kho­meini but it has a great deal to do with extre­mism. Of course, the Brot­her­hood is dis­tinc­tively Egyp­tian, but it is a dis­tinc­tively Egyp­tian Sunni form of extre­mism.

I’ve wor­ked with Ira­ni­ans, I’ve wor­ked here. There is 100 per­cent dif­fe­rence between the two socie­ties.”

Precisely. But the Brot­her­hood is still a group that wants to set up an Isla­mist society to govern every aspect of life under Isla­mic law as inter­preted by the Brot­her­hood. Ger­many and Japan are more dif­fe­rent than Egypt and Iran but both had fascist regi­mes. The USSR and China are more dif­fe­rent than Egypt abd Iran but both had Com­mu­nist regi­mes.

2. “The Mus­lim Brot­her­hood is a reli­giously con­ser­va­tive group.”

False. Main­stream Egyp­tian cle­rics are reli­giously con­ser­va­tive. To be reli­giously con­ser­va­tive is to want to main­tain the sta­tus quo. The Brot­her­hood is quite unhappy with Egyp­tian society and wants to change it dra­s­ti­cally. That is why it is a revo­lu­tio­nary group even though it has been pati­ent and care­ful about pushing the revo­lu­tion.

And the claim that the Brot­her­hood is non-vio­lent is also quite tricky. It dis­solved its ter­ro­rist wing only because of govern­ment pres­sure and has advo­cated ter­ro­rism against Ame­ri­cans and Israe­lis. It applau­ded and incited the assas­si­na­tions of secu­lar acti­vists and Egypt’s lead­ing nove­list. As I’ve pointed out in pre­vious articles, its rhe­to­ric sounds quite like al-Qaida (though it is not at all fri­endly toward al-Qaida as an orga­niza­tion).

3. “They are a minority in Egypt. They are not a majority of the Egyp­tian people, but they have a lot of cre­di­bi­lity because all the other libe­ral par­ties have been smot­he­red for 30 years.”

Well, they are less than 50 per­cent. But in a situa­tion of severe repres­sion and har­ass­ment they rece­i­ved 20 per­cent of the vote. Thus, it is rea­so­nable to think they have more sup­port than that. Polls show very hard­line reli­gious views among the majority of Egyp­ti­ans. And no other group has any­where near the level of sup­port that the Brot­her­hood does. Once given a real chance it may grow quickly as has hap­pe­ned in other countries, like Iran.

Inci­den­tally, the Brot­her­hood has been more smot­he­red than have libe­ral par­ties yet remai­ned far stron­ger than libe­ral par­ties. That tells you somet­hing about rela­tive levels of sup­port, tough­ness, and orga­niza­tion.

4. Here is the biggest lie of all by far:

They are in favor of a federa­list state. They are in favor of a wor­ding on the base of con­sti­tu­tion that has red lines that every Egyp­tian has the same rights, same obli­ga­tion, that the state in no way will be a state based on reli­gion.”

This is so ridi­cu­lous that it can only be told to those who know not­hing about the Mus­lim Brot­her­hood. Accor­ding to its plat­form, the Brot­her­hood favors grea­ter rights for Mus­lims; fewer rights for women, and a strong uni­tary state based on reli­gion. ElBa­radei knows he is con­ceal the group’s true nature.

5. “And I have been reaching out to them. We need to include them.”

Actually, since laun­ching his can­di­dacy for pre­si­dent, ElBa­radei has been depen­dent on the Brot­her­hood, which has fur­nis­hed most of the sup­port for his poli­ti­cal career. He is not merely inclu­ding them, he must give them a big slice of power. And they are far stron­ger than he is, than any libe­ral democra­tic move­ment is in Egypt.

So is it a “myth” that the only alter­na­tive is eit­her the Muba­rak regime (or what might be cal­led the Nas­ser-Sadat-Muba­rak regime)? We are going to find out. But in jud­ging that issue ElBa­radei is lying to us. If he spoke the truth, he might have a bet­ter chance of dis­pro­ving this “myth.” But his lies make me sus­pi­cious that –even if a bet­ter alter­na­tive is pos­sible — ElBa­radei is going to prove Mubarak’s myth to be accu­rate.

Opp­rin­ne­lig skre­vet for Rubins blogg

Pos­ted: 01 Feb 2011

ANNONSE
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  • Har ElBa­radei en kob­ling til Iran? Mulig­he­ten er der. Hva slags rela­sjon vet ingen, men det er liten tvil om hva Iran øns­ker, og har ElBa­radei en kob­ling til Tehe­ran er det neppe gode nyhe­ter. Hvor­dan dette rimer med ElBa­radei som en demo­krati­for­kjem­per er vans­ke­lig å se. Elba­radei kom­mer inn på top­pen av kon­tak­ter som alt fin­nes mel­lom Mus­limske Bror­skap og Iran. Lik­he­tene er mange, ikke minst affi­ni­te­ten til nazis­men.

    Han var sjef for IEAE når Pakis­tan skaf­fet seg atom­vå­pen, når AQ Khan hjalp Libya å for­søke seg, og når North Korea ble en atom­makt. Også fab­rik­ken i Syria som Israel bombet var under hans vakt. Og ikke minst han ble “lurt” av Iran i 20 år. 

    Hele spørs­må­let er selv­sagt i hvil­ken grad dette er del av Irans plan og design, om de nå får inn­fly­telse i Egypt. Inn­fly­telse eller part­ner. Saken er, har USA tenkt over hva som vil skje om Mus­limske bror­skap får inn­fly­telse i Egypt? Hele spil­let end­res dra­ma­tisk. Har USA med å ta avstand fra Muba­rak åpnet for Mus­limske Bror­skap? ALt demo­krati­snakk er søtt, men Cairo er ikke Praha. 

    For Israel utsik­tene er at en går fra en nabo som har holdt fred i over 30 år til en som lover øde­leg­gelse av Israel. Senest: A lead­ing mem­ber of the Mus­lim Brot­her­hood in Egypt told the Ara­bic-lan­guage Ira­nian news network Al-Alam on Mon­day that he would like to see the Egyp­tian people pre­pare for war against Israel, accor­ding to the Heb­rew-lan­guage busi­ness new­spa­per Cal­ca­list. http://www.jpost.com/Headlines/Article.aspx?id=206130

    Hamas er en under­or­ga­ni­sa­sjon til det Mus­limske Bror­skap. Hamas og Hez­bol­lah har et sam­ar­beid. Altså et Shia-Sunni sam­ar­beid er mulig. Egypt blir neppe en nikke­dukke til Iran, men en part­ner i et pro­sjekt med noen fel­les inter­es­ser. Det er ille nok.

    Kob­lin­gen Iran – ElBa­radei er ikke helt ny, men nå skjer mye, fort. Bay­efski i Pay­a­mas Media sier det rett ut, Han er Irans front­man. http://pajamasmedia.com/tatler/2011/01/30/mohammed-el-baradei-the-iranian-frontman/

    Det mest hån­gri­pe­lige bevis er at Iran angi­ve­lig støt­tet ElBaradei’s valg­kamp:

    Source: Al Youm Al Sabeh Sep­tem­ber 6, 2010
    The Egyp­tian New­spa­per Al Youm Al Sabeh reports: In a com­mu­ni­ca­tion to the Att­or­ney Gene­ral of Egypt, Dr. Yasser Najib Abdel Mab­boud, has accu­sed Dr. Moha­med ElBa­radei, for­mer Direc­tor Gene­ral of Inter­na­tio­nal Atomic Energy Agency and a can­di­date in the Egyp­tian pre­si­den­tial elections, of rece­i­ving funds exce­e­ding $7 mil­lion (US) from Iran’s lea­dership as sup­port for ‘poli­ti­cal reform in Egypt’.

    Abdul Mab­boud , a can­di­date of the Natio­nal Party and who like El Baradei is also run­ning for the Egyp­tian Pre­si­den­tial election, was infor­med of the Ira­nian leadership’s wil­ling­ness to sup­port ElBa­radei finan­cially via an Arab busi­ness­man living in Europe. The check in the amount of $ 7 mil­lion is said to be meant to cover the finan­cial costs of the election cam­paign and the acti­vities of the Front for Change.

    Accor­ding to the Egyp­tian new­spa­per, a meeting between the Arab busi­ness­men who is said to be close to El Baradei and who has only iden­ti­fied by the ini­ti­als A. E. and Ira­nian offi­cial took place in a hotel in Bucharest, the capi­tal Roma­nia. After weeks of covert con­tact, the Ira­nian regime’s envoy appa­rently met with the busi­ness­man to com­plete a busi­ness deal. Reportedly the Ira­nian envoy told the busi­ness­man to con­vey to ElBa­radei that he has Iran’s com­plete sup­port.

    Clau­dia Ros­sett skri­ver også i Paja­mas­me­dia at “ElBa­radei is no Aung San Suu Kyi”. 

    As head of the IAEA, ElBa­radei often looked like a shill for Iran — repeatedly glos­sing over obvious signs of Iran’s nuclear weapons pro­gram, obfus­ca­ting the rea­lities, and delay­ing action. 

    In the Jeru­sa­lem Post, Caro­line Glick gives a good run­down of how, in the U.S. effort to cor­ral Iran’s nuclear pro­gram, ElBa­radei was not part of the answer, but part of the pro­blem.

    Glick also descri­bes ElBaradei’s cozy rela­tion­ship with the Mus­lim Brot­her­hood — pro­ge­ni­tor of al-Qaeda and Hamas — quo­ting him as giving a recent inter­view to Der Spiegel in which he clai­med the Mus­lim Brot­her­hood has “not com­mit­ted any acts of vio­lence in five decades.”


    Tanke­kors: Den som kri­ti­se­rer isla­mis­tene og for­sva­rer den norske og euro­pe­iske tra­di­sjon, moder­ni­tet, huma­nisme og kul­tur er av enkelte kalt brune, rasis­ter, fascis­ter og også Nasjo­nal Sam­ling er truk­ket fram (senest av en kom­men­ta­tor på Verdi­de­batt). Poen­get at Det Mus­limske Bror­skap har sterke, doku­men­terte bånd til nazis­men og Hit­ler fra 20 tal­let og fram­over set­ter dette i et under­lig lys. En av dem var Stor­muf­tien av Jeru­sa­lem. Hans besøk hos Hit­ler, hans inn­sats for å mobi­li­sere en ara­bisk SS dvi­sjon osv er kjent stoff. 

    Så vidt jeg vet var det aldri noe retts­opp­gjør i Midt-Østen, selv om Frank­rike og Stor­bri­tan­nia kunne sørge for det. Mange av dem som siden ble jaget av Nas­ser, eller fengs­let. Og mange endte opp i Saudi Ara­bia og der skal være en link til Wha­bis­men .- som sik­kert andre vet mer om en jeg. 

  • Fra dagens Der Spiegel (engelsk utgave) om hvor­dan bror­ska­pet fjer­net vol­de­lig sym­bo­likk og fram­står som fre­de­lig oppo­si­sjon.
    http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,742940,00.html

    The Mus­lim Brot­her­hood has been Egypt’s largest oppo­sition group for years. Now, with the regime of Pre­si­dent Hosni Muba­rak wob­bling, the orga­niza­tion could find its way into power — and is doing its best to look legi­ti­mate.

    A Koran, two crossed swords and a mes­sage: “Pre­pare yours­elves.” The crest of the Isla­mist Egyp­tian group Mus­lim Brot­her­hood is not­hing if not mar­tial. Per­haps even a bit too mar­tial for the inter­na­tio­nal press. 

    On the first floor of a shabby apart­ment buil­ding on El-Malek El-Saleh street in down­town Cairo, the group — which for years has been Egypt’s largest oppo­sition move­ment — is rece­i­ving a gaggle of scri­bes from abroad. And the offi­cial sym­bol is now­here to be seen.

  • Opp­kla­ring før noen går i taket. Når jeg nevnte en fel­les affi­ni­tet til nazis­men sik­tet jeg til Mus­limske bror­skap og dagens regime i Iran. Ikke ElBa­radei.

  • Da jeg bodde i Dar­las­ton, hadde jeg en egyp­tisk nabo på 19 år. Han kunne for­telle at: 

    All Egyp­ti­ans lie, and that I am a good per­so­nal fri­end og pre­si­dent Nas­ser” (1964)

    Jeg kunne jo ikke annet enn å tro på ham.

    Dise hol­der et øye på Brød­rene.

    MIDEAST CRISIS: Egyp­tian Mus­lim Brot­her­hood Says Muba­rak Pledge To Step Down Will Not End Pro­tests.

    http://globalmbreport.org/

    Det som ikke len­ger for­bau­ser meg, er at mus­li­mer fort­set­ter med sine usann­he­ter til tross for at de bør vite at sann­he­ten lig­ger opp i dagen på net­tet.

  • mikal13

    God artik­kel av Bill Bon­ner fra daily reckon­ning;

    http://dailyreckoning.com/youth-and-islamic-fundamentalism/

  • Stand and Scratch His Head? What Is Obama’s Position on Egypt? 

    http://www.pjtv.com/?cmd=mpg&mpid=105&load=4825

    Hvor meget har Mrs. Clin­ton og Pre­si­dent Obama egent­lig for­stått?

  • Hilde­gunn­REgde­tveit

    Dore Gold, lede­ren av Jeru­sa­lem Cen­ter for Pub­lic Affairs i Jeru­sa­lem, gir en over­sik­te­lig his­to­risk sam­men­drag av Bror­ska­pet, og for­kla­rer over­gan­gen og bak­grun­nen for det som nå skjer i Egypt:

    Our Mis­sion: World Domi­na­tion” (siya­dat al-dunya). This hea­der was changed after 9/11, but the pub­li­ca­tion still car­ries the Mus­lim Brotherhood’s motto which includes: “Jihad is our path; mar­tyr­dom is our aspiration.”5

    The cur­rent Supreme Guide of the Mus­lim Brot­her­hood in Egypt, Muham­mad Badi’, gave a ser­mon in Sep­tem­ber 2010 sta­ting that Mus­lims today “need to under­stand that the improve­ment and change that the [Mus­lim] nation seeks can only be attai­ned through jihad and sacri­fice and by rai­sing a jihadi gene­ra­tion that pur­sues death, just as the ene­mies pur­sue life.”6 In short, the Mus­lim Brot­her­hood remains com­mit­ted to sup­por­ting mili­tant acti­vities in order to advance its poli­ti­cal aims. From look­ing at the bio­grap­hies of its most pro­mi­nent gra­dua­tes, one can imme­dia­tely under­stand the organization’s long-term com­mit­ment to jiha­dism:
    1. Abdul­lah Azzam (of the Jor­da­nian Mus­lim Brot­her­hood) and Muham­mad Qutb (of the Egyp­tian Mus­lim Brot­her­hood) taught at King Abdul Aziz Uni­ver­sity in Jidda, Saudi Ara­bia, where they had a stu­dent named Osama bin Laden. Azzam went off to Pakis­tan with his stu­dent, bin Laden, to help the muja­hi­din fight the Sovi­ets in Afgha­ni­stan.

    2. Ayman al-Zawa­hiri (bin Laden’s deputy) grew up in the Egyp­tian Mus­lim Brot­her­hood.

    3. Kha­lid Sheikh Muham­mad (the al-Qaeda mas­ter­mind of the 9/11 attacks) came out of the Kuwaiti Mus­lim Brot­her­hood. Given this back­ground, the Mus­lim Brot­her­hood has been widely regar­ded in the Arab world as the incu­ba­tor of the jiha­dist ideo­logy. A for­mer Kuwaiti Minis­ter of Edu­ca­tion, Dr. Ahmad Al-Rab’i, argued in Al-Sharq al-Awsat on July 25, 2005, that the foun­ders of most modern ter­ro­rist groups in the Middle East emer­ged from “the mantle” of the Mus­lim Brot­her­hood

    http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=442&PID=0&IID=5953

  • 7grace

    Jeg vet jeg maser, men det er èn ting som er vel­dig vel­dig vik­tig:
    De lov­ly­dige, ikke-vol­de­lige, inte­grerte isla­mis­tene er de far­lige!

    Deres misjon (da´wah) er å inn­føre islam fra inn­si­den.
    De arbei­der (bevisst el ube­visst) i sym­biose med jiha­dis­tene (da´wah er del av jihad).
    Da´wah er verk­tøy for å endre din og min være­måte og tanke­måte.
    Vår største trus­sel er ikke ter­ror, men immi­gra­sjon.

    Da´wahs reli­giøse grunn­lag:
    _Mu­ham­med; ”war is deceit”. Og islam er i krig med Ves­ten > taqi­yah og kit­man.
    _taqi­yah: lyve for å skjule sin tro/hensikt, med islams beste for øye.
    _kit­man: for­telle deler av sann­he­ten;
    man kan fritt benekte deler av islam, man kan sverge tro­skap til folk, bibel, norsk lov etc –
    fordi kun den indre tro er den avgjø­rende

    Stra­tegi­om­rå­der:
    _ta avstand fra vold og ter­ror
    _”vi er også norske/svenske/franske” etc
    _sær­krav: halal, segre­ge­ring, hijab, islamske hel­lig­da­ger
    _jobbe for hold­nings­end­rin­ger (sær­lig hos kristne)
    _ut­dan­nings­sys­te­met (+ bygge opp islamske og ara­bisk stu­dier)
    _po­li­tik­ken (benytte seg av uvi­ten­het, skape for­vir­ring, splitt og hersk, posi­sjo­ne­ring)
    _jus­sen (kode­ord: ”kren­kelse”) > trus­ler og demo­ra­li­se­ring + selv­sagt posi­sjo­ne­ring
    _media (igjen skape for­vir­ring: ”dette er ikke islam, det er irre­le­vant, du kan ikke ara­bisk,
    ute av kon­tekst”… + posi­sjo­ne­ring)
    _gjenta og gjenta ”kode­set­nin­gene”:
    ”ter­ro­ris­ter har kap­ret islam, islam er fred, vi for­døm­mer vold, islam og demo­krati er for­ene­lig”
    _im­mi­gra­sjon og demo­grafi
    _mi­sjo­ne­ring (sær­lig blant fat­tige)

    Begrep som ”sivilt sam­funn”, ”stat, ”demo­krati” har vest­lig opp­rin­nelse.
    Dette fin­nes ikke i de ara­biske land (fler­tal­let av deres ”sta­ter” er kon­stru­ert av Ves­ten etter 1. v.krig) –
    mus­limske land har tid­li­gere basert seg på blods­bånd, stam­mer, områ­der, tros­ret­nin­ger, ummah, kalifer/sultaner etc.

    Hva & hvem er isla­mis­te­nes hjel­pere?
    _venstre­si­den
    _nai­vi­tet
    _kunn­skaps­løs­het
    _apati
    _grå­dig­het
    _laid­back­het
    _ryg­ges­løs­het
    _FN/EU/feiltolkede men­neske­ret­ter
    fyll ut….

    Men vi skal ikke til­late dette. Det onde sei­rer kun hvis det gode ikke hand­ler, som Burke sa 🙂

  • Olav Fage­lund Knud­sen

    Jeg synes vi skal være for­sik­tige med å kalle ube­kref­tede påstan­der for løg­ner. Jeg tror også at det mus­limske bror­ska­pet øns­ker en mer radi­kal isla­mis­tisk inn­ret­ning av den egyp­tiske stat og sam­fun­net. Men vi skal kan­skje ikke jage dem over i et hjørne der de fore­lø­pig ikke bevis­lig befin­ner seg. Vi har fien­der nok på den siden alle­rede. I et så stort og sam­men­satt sam­funn som det egyp­tiske tror jeg det er tro­lig at bror­ska­pet kom­mer til å split­tes ganske raskt i flere gre­ner når mulig­he­ten til større fri­het åpner seg.

    • Splitte seg når mulig­he­ten til større fri­het åpner seg? Fordi at..?

      Her er agen­daen og frem­gangs­må­tene:

      * Networ­king and coor­di­na­ting actions between like­minded Isla­mist orga­niza­tions;
      * Avo­id­ing open alli­an­ces with known ter­ro­rist orga­niza­tions and indi­vi­duals to main­tain the appea­rance of “mode­ra­tion”;
      * Infil­tra­ting and taking over exis­ting Mus­lim orga­niza­tions to rea­lign them towards the Mus­lim Brotherhood’s col­lective goals;
      * Using decep­tion to mask the intended goals of Isla­mist actions, as long as it doesn’t con­flict with shari’a law;
      * Avo­id­ing social con­flicts with Western­ers locally, natio­nally or glo­bally, that might damage the long-term abi­lity to expand the Isla­mist power­base in the West or pro­voke a lash back against Mus­lims;
      * Estab­lish­ing finan­cial networks to fund the work of con­ver­sion of the West, inclu­ding the sup­port of full-time admi­ni­stra­tors and wor­kers;
      * Con­duc­ting surveil­lance, obtai­ning data, and estab­lish­ing col­lection and data storage capa­bi­lities;
      * Put­ting into place a watch­dog sys­tem for moni­to­ring Western media to warn Mus­lims of “inter­na­tio­nal plots fomen­ted against them”;
      * Cul­ti­va­ting an Isla­mist intel­lec­tual com­mu­nity, inclu­ding the estab­lish­ment of think-tanks and advo­cacy groups, and pub­lish­ing “aca­de­mic” stu­dies, to legi­ti­mize Isla­mist positions and to chro­nicle the his­tory of Isla­mist move­ments;
      * Devel­o­ping a com­pre­hen­sive 100-year plan to advance Isla­mist ideo­logy throug­hout the world;
      * Balancing inter­na­tio­nal objec­ti­ves with local flex­i­bi­lity;
      * Buil­ding exten­sive social networks of schools, hos­pi­tals and cha­ri­table orga­niza­tions dedi­cated to Isla­mist ideals so that con­tact with the move­ment for Mus­lims in the West is con­stant;
      * Invol­ving ideo­lo­gically com­mit­ted Mus­lims in democra­ti­cally-elected insti­tu­tions on all levels in the West, inclu­ding govern­ment, NGOs, pri­vate orga­niza­tions and labor unions;
      * Instru­men­tally using exis­ting Western insti­tu­tions until they can be con­verted and put into ser­vice of Islam;
      * Draf­ting Isla­mic con­sti­tu­tions, laws and poli­cies for even­tual imple­men­ta­tion;
      * Avo­id­ing con­flict wit­hin the Isla­mist move­ments on all levels, inclu­ding the devel­op­ment of processes for con­flict reso­lu­tion;
      * Insti­tu­ting alli­an­ces with Western “pro­gres­sive” orga­niza­tions that share simi­lar goals;
      * Crea­ting auto­no­mous “security for­ces” to pro­tect Mus­lims in the West;
      * Infla­ming vio­lence and kee­ping Mus­lims living in the West “in a jihad frame of mind”;
      * Sup­por­ting jihad move­ments across the Mus­lim world through preaching, pro­pa­ganda, per­son­nel, fun­ding, and tech­ni­cal and ope­ra­tio­nal sup­port;
      * Making the Pale­sti­nian cause a glo­bal wedge issue for Mus­lims;
      * Adop­ting the total libe­ra­tion of Pale­stine from Israel and the crea­tion of an Isla­mic state as a key­stone in the plan for glo­bal Isla­mic domi­na­tion;
      * Insti­ga­ting a con­stant cam­paign to incite hatred by Mus­lims against Jews and rejec­ting any discus­sions of con­ci­lia­tion or coexist­ence with them;
      * Actively crea­ting jihad ter­ror cells wit­hin Pale­stine;
      * Lin­king the ter­ro­rist acti­vities in Pale­stine with the glo­bal ter­ror move­ment;
      * Col­lecting suf­fi­ci­ent funds to inde­fi­nitely per­pe­tuate and sup­port jihad around the world;

      http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=4476

      Rea­gerte noen på at nes­ten 800 mus­li­mer meldte seg inn i KrF ved val­get i 2005?

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