Lally Weymouth fra the Washington Post intervjuer Mohamed ElBaradei, i dag visepresident for Egypt. Weymouth «keeps harping» på de samme tingene som koker ned til at Brorskapet er behandlet urettferdig. Hva har ElBaradei tenkt å gjøre med det?
Men hvis man har et slikt utgangspunkt vil det ikke være mulig å løse krisen, da vil Brorskapet forstå at de har en mektig alliert, og sette seg på bakbena og aldri gi seg før Mohamed Morsi er gjeninnsatt.
Derfor har ord som kompromiss ulik betydning, i munnen til ElBaradei og John Kerry.
At ordet kompromiss brukt på den amerikanske/europeiske måten innebærer forståelse for Brorskapet er noe egypterne for lengst har oppfattet. Derfor den økende antiamerikanismen i Egypt. Men amerikanske journalister forstår ikke antipatien. Holdningen til de militæres maktovertakelse er gjennomgående negativ. Og vestlige reportere vil ikke forstå hvorfor hæren måtte gripe inn. Det hjelper ikke at folk som ElBaradei sier at det ellers ville brutt ut borgerkrig. Man later heller som det er de militære som nå styrer landet mot konflikt.
Men ElBaradei er ikke i tvil om hvilken versjon som er korrekt. Det er hans land. Dets fremtid som står på spill.
They should continue to be part of the political process, they should continue to participate in the rewriting of the constitution, in running for parliamentary elections and presidential elections. You have the tea party, and you have the American Civil Liberties Union. There is a big, wide gap, but they are able to live together under the Constitution.
So members of the Muslim Brotherhood have to understand that Morsi failed but they should be able to run for office?
Morsi failed not because he is a member of the Brotherhood but because he failed to deliver. In a democracy, when you get 20 million people in the street, you resign. Unfortunately, we don’t have a process of recall or impeachment like you have. It was a popular uprising rejecting Mr. Morsi’s continuing in power. Unfortunately, people had to call on the army to intervene. The army had to intervene because short of that, we would have ended up in a civil war. People went to the street on the 30th of June and were not psychologically ready to go home until Morsi left office. Either it would have continued, with all the bloodshed that would have come with it, or Mr. Morsi had to leave. It would have been ideal for Mr. Morsi to resign, but he didn’t.
So you have this esoteric discussion, whether this is a coup d’état. When you have 20 million people calling on Mr. Morsi to leave, and the army had to step in to avoid a civil war, does that make it a coup d’état? Of course not. It’s not your classical army intervention. It’s really the army providing support to a popular uprising. It was no different than what happened under [former president Hosni] Mubarak, except this time you had the Brotherhood and the Salafis — you had a country much more divided than during Mubarak’s time, when he didn’t have much support other than his apparatchiks. So they had to come in. But nobody wants to see the army back. The army itself understands that they cannot govern, they are unable to govern, and people don’t want them to govern.