Washington Post har en god gjennomgang av president Mohamed Morsis tale, som var en tale om opposisjonen. Den fikk tilbud om å innlede dialog på Morsis premisser eller bli møtt med utstøting og vold. Ikke akkurat et tilbud som er egnet til forsoning.
NTB heiste at Morsi kom med en innrømmelse: at han skal gi fra seg fullmaktene til å styre eneveldig når folkeavstemningen om grunnlove er avholdt. Men dette er ingen innrømmelse. Det bekrefter bare hva opposisjonen har mistenkt hele tiden: at fullmaktene ble innført for å sikre at den islamistiske grunnloven blir vedtatt. Brorskapet kommer til å fremstille valget som et valg mellom stabilitet eller kaos, og egypterne vil stemme for stabilitet. Det er denne følelse av å være låst som gjør opposisjonen desperat. Dette dramaet om skjebnen til Midtøstens viktigste land kommer ikke frem i norske medier.
1. Morsi really, really wants the constitutional referendum to happen. His concession, to drop his specially decreed powers only after the vote, supports fears that he made the decree specifically to secure the referendum. Some analysts say that voters are likely to approve it almost regardless of its text, seeing it as a vote for the revolution. “By saying ‘yes,’ you’re saying yes to elected institutions, more stability, more normalcy, and therefore more security and more investments,” Omar Ashour told the Post’s Abigail Hauslohner. “A ‘no’ vote is a vote for the unknown.”
Here’s why the opposition is so worried about this: the constitution-writing assembly is dominated by Islamists and widely criticized as unrepresentative of Egypt. Neither the constitution nor the referendum can be blocked by the nation’s courts, according to Morsi’s decree, which he conspicuously made just before the Islamist-dominated constitutional assembly unveiled its final draft. As long the referendum still goes forward, and Morsi’s decree remains in place, the Islamist president is probably going to secure the Islamist-friendly constitution as the law of Egypt.
Morsi slapp sine tilhengere løs på opposisjonen, som riktignok har brent partikontorer, men ikke fysisk gått løs på motstandere. Dermed trappet han opp situasjonen mange hakk. Når Morsi taler til nasjonen og beskylder opposisjonen for å være bøller, som er betalt av bakmenn, har han vist at han er akkurat som Hosni Mubarak, eller verre. Dette skuespillet, løgnene og brutaliteten, er heller ikke kommet frem i norske medier.
2. On protesters, echoes of Hosni Mubarak. Morsi spent years in the opposition during Mubarak’s reign, when the regime worked assiduously to delegitimize anyone who protested or opposed him. So it was surprising to hear Morsi repeating some of Mubarak’s old lines. He suggested that protesters are “thugs” creating chaos, that they are only protesting because they are paid to do so, and that they are backed by unnamed foreigners. Mubarak made similar accusations during the 2011 protests, about the Muslim Brotherhood among others.
Morsi also strongly criticized opposition protesters for committing acts of violence but did not acknowledge that some of his own Muslim Brotherhood supporters had done the same, which is not likely to assure many opposition figures that Morsi is a fair broker.
Norske medier gjør et nummer av at Morsi tilbød dialog lørdag 8. desember. Men hvor ekte er en dialog hvor man truer med vold hvis den ikke blir akseptert? Morsi definerte de som ikke godtok tilbudet som infiltratører, og disse vil bli behandlet på den måten man behandler voldsmenn på. Sa han.
3. The stick is on the table now. Morsi implicitly offered two paths forward for the opposition, which he variously welcomed with open arms to participate in the Dec. 8 national dialogue or condemned as “infiltrators” who would be “penalized.” The language could suggest that Morsi is willing to place opposition groups or leaders in the “political differences” category if they do things his way or the “hired thugs” category if they continue to demonstrate. He called for the protesters to pull back, warning that they were “threatening the security of the homeland,” as Mubarak did of protesters in 2011. That sort of characterization could, hypothetically, be used to justify more extreme measures. So could Morsi’s insistence that “police interrogation” had proven that the protesters were paid by shadowy foreign sources. It sure sounded like he was paving the way for a crackdown, or at least keeping the option open.
4. The opposition faces a real dilemma. Does it participate in Morsi’s Dec. 8 dialogue? If he’s sincere about seeking input and possibly even offering it concessions – maybe by amending the constitution, for example, or sending it back to the assembly – then this could be a crucial opportunity for the opposition to secure some of its requests, though not the unlikely demand that Morsi resign. However, attending would lend Morsi’s process and thus his constitution more legitimacy, which would be bad for the opposition if the constitution doesn’t actually change enough to satisfy it. Still, boycotting seems like a certain loss for the opposition, allowing Morsi to ignore its demands and declare that he’d heard out the people when only supporters participate in his dialogue.