Nytt

Hvis FN trodde de var kvitt Peter Galbraith ved å gi ham sparken, så tar de feil. Oppmerksomheten rundt valgsvindelen og Kai Eides håndtering av den bare øker. Det som kommer frem er alvorlig: FN kan ikke leve med at Kai Eide på vegne av FN dekker over organisert valgsvindel.

Galbraith retter to alvorlige beskyldninger mot Eide. Den første gjelder såkalte «ghost-valglokaler», dvs. stemmesteder hvor det ville være vanskelig å gjennomføre trygge valg. Galbraith ville ha dem fjernet, Eide motsatte seg et slikt skritt. Det var fra disse stedene det kom flest falske stemmer.

In July, I learned that at least 1,500 polling centers (out of 7,000) were to be located in places so insecure that no one from the IEC, the Afghan National Army or the Afghan National Police had ever visited them. Clearly, these polling centers would not open on Election Day. At a minimum, their existence on the books would create large-scale confusion, but I was more concerned about the risk of fraud.

Local commission staff members were hardly experienced election professionals; in many instances they were simply agents of the local power brokers, usually aligned with Karzai. If no independent observers or candidate representatives, let alone voters, could even visit the listed location of a polling center, these IEC staffers could easily stuff ballot boxes without ever taking them to the assigned location. Or they could simply report results without any votes being in the ballot boxes.

Along with ambassadors from the United States and key allies, I met with the Afghan ministers of defense and the interior as well as the commission’s chief election officer. We urged them either to produce a credible plan to secure these polling centers (which the head of the Afghan army had told me was impossible) or to close them down. Not surprisingly, the ministers — who served a president benefiting from the fraud — complained that I had even raised the matter. Eide ordered me not to discuss the ghost polling centers any further. On Election Day, these sites produced hundreds of thousands of phony Karzai votes.

Det andre punktet gjelder bevis på valgsvindel. FN-kontoret hadde sin egen enhet som var i sving på valgdagen og samlet inn bevis på uregelmessigheter. Galbraith ville at disse bevisene skulle overleveres kontrollkommisjonen. Karzais regjering protesterte og Eide tok Karzais parti. Dette er alvorlig. Det er aktiv medvirkning til at en kandidat vinner ved hjelp av valgsvindel.

At other critical stages in the election process, I was similarly ordered not to pursue the issue of fraud. The U.N. mission set up a 24-hour election center during the voting and in the early stages of the counting. My staff collected evidence on hundreds of cases of fraud around the country and, more important, gathered information on turnout in key southern provinces where few voters showed up but large numbers of votes were being reported. Eide ordered us not to share this data with anyone, including the Electoral Complaints Commission, a U.N.-backed Afghan institution legally mandated to investigate fraud. Naturally, my colleagues wondered why they had taken the risks to collect this evidence if it was not to be used.

In early September, I got word that the IEC was about to abandon its published anti-fraud policies, allowing it to include enough fraudulent votes in the final tally to put Karzai over the 50 percent threshold needed to avoid a runoff. After I called the chief electoral officer to urge him to stick with the original guidelines, Karzai issued a formal protest accusing me of foreign interference. My boss sided with Karzai.

Galbraith beskriver en tre-trinnsrakett som indikerer at Kai Eide systematisk har hjulpet Karzai til å vinne ved hjelp av valgsvindel. Eide har gjort dette mulig ved å fjerne bevisene. Galbraith spør om FN kan leve med dette. Det internasjonale samfunn mister folks tillit.

What I Saw at the Afghan Election