Lekkede dokumenter som Le Monde har fått fatt i, viser at Frankrikes hemmelige tjenester i fjor høst sluttet å følge sporene etter Mohamed Merah, som i vår drepte sju mennesker i Toulouse innen han selv ble skutt av politiet, til tross for at han hadde mange forbindelser til jihadister og var havnet i søkelyset allerede i 2006.
The report prepared for the French government and leaked to Le Monde cites a DCRI officer raising concerns about the man in March 2011.
The officer said Merah rarely left his home and was paranoid and suspicious. He had no internet in his flat, did not appear to have a mobile phone and always used public telephone booths.
Another note, on 26 April 2011, reported that Merah was violent to women for having shown disrespect to a Muslim.
The note said he glorified the murder of «Western infidels» in songs he composed, and he was photographed with a knife and Koran. He travelled frequently to the Middle East.
He had a long list of contacts to Islamist movements in the UK, the same leaked document says.
According to Le Monde, Merah was last questioned in November 2011 and had great difficulty explaining a visit to Pakistan where he had been training with militants.
Just a week later, the DCRI suddenly stopped monitoring him.
Judge Christophe Teissier said he was surprised by the move.
The judge said Merah’s profile was typical of a home-grown threat – he was independent, radicalised quickly, and did everything possible to conceal the support and training he was receiving.
Hva kan grunnen være til at man simpelthen slutter å følge med på hva en sånn person foretar seg?
Den mest nærliggende forklaringen er kapasitetsproblemer. Betyr det at for mange individer i etterretningens søkelys har enda mer alarmerende profiler enn Merah?
En alternativ forklaring er rot i den interne informasjonsbehandlingen, en tredje mulighet infiltrasjon av de hemmelige tjenestene. Ingen av disse er særlig hyggelige å tenke på.