Marine Le Pen har er mye bredere politisk nedslagsfelt enn sin far, ikke bare når det gjelder antisemittisme. Hennes hovedtema er kampen mot globalisering.
Denne fremstilles som en historisk lovmessighet i Norge. Men Marine Le Pen sier at den nå gir konsekvenser som strider mot landenes interesser. Om innstrammingene i Hellas og Irland sier hun feks. at de redder euroen, og ofrer folket.
Det er et budskap som resonnerer med grasrota og konkurrerer med venstresiden.
Christopher Caldwell har en artikkel om fenomenet Marine Le Pen i siste Weekly Standard. Han sier hun er av et helt annet format enn sin far.
Le Pen’s youngest daughter, Marine, a 42-year-old lawyer and member of the European parliament, won the party’s leadership handily in January, beating a rival who represented the FN’s small Catholic wing. Ms. Le Pen, who has been divorced twice, claims to speak for a more “laic” sensibility. She lacks her father’s electoral baggage. She has explicitly repudiated the anti-Semitism in which the party stewed throughout his tenure. And she has gifts that her father never possessed. The elder Le Pen had only two oratorical registers—indignation and buffoonery. Marine Le Pen can give a moving speech. The one she gave at Tours on the day she was elected party leader was hailed as a triumph. What is more, she has a platform that a lot of French voters like and no other party will touch: Ms. Le Pen considers globalization a mistake, lock, stock, and barrel.
Noe av det ubehaget som Caldwell omtaler er følbart i alle europeiske land: åpne grenser, fri flyt av mennesker og kriminalitet, smugling, arbeidsdumping, og for eurosonen: innstramminger for å redde euroen. Følelsen i landene er at alt flyter: identitet og fellesskap redefineres, men på en måte som mange ikke føler seg hjemme i.
Just as Nazism and communism were the totalitarianisms of the twentieth century, Islamism and globalism are the totalitarianisms of the twenty-first, Ms. Le Pen believes. France needs to reexamine its membership in the European Union (which has robbed great nations of their sovereignty and saddled them with an unworkable currency) and in NATO (which has subordinated the country’s foreign policy interests to those of the United States), and it should not make a dogma of free trade. “This identity-killing globalization,” she said at Tours, “has turned into an economic horror, a social tsunami, a moral Chernobyl.” Then she led into more familiar FN themes—the International Monetary Fund, the “demographic submersion” of France, self-appointed elites, and the need for French citizens to “pick up the flag.”
Sarkozy lovte et brudd med den utflytende politikken da han ble valgt i 2007, men det kom aldri noe brudd.
Caldwell beskriver et fenomen som også er gjenkjennelig i Norge: velgermassen blir stadig mer konservativ, men det skjer ikke gjennom den offentlige debatten, snarere på tvers av den.
Maybe the biggest cultural event in France over the past year has been the success of the film Of Gods and Men, the story of seven Trappist monks kidnapped and beheaded in Algeria in 1996. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) claimed responsibility for the killings. Much as the American movie Juno (2007) was discussed for its attitudes towards abortion, even though it is not really about that, Of Gods and Men is a movie about Christian teachings on peace that has provoked a lot of anxiety about Islam. Such anxiety has been brewing for a while. In the rue Myrha in Paris’s 18th arrondissement, hundreds of Muslims fill the street every Friday afternoon for prayers. The practice is unpopular among local residents, it is much discussed on YouTube, and Marine Le Pen has capitalized on it. “Those who pray in a public thoroughfare are acting like an occupying power,” she said in Lyon in December.
I Norge er denne filmen lansert med kristen martyrglorie. Aftenpostens Kaja Korsvold intervjuet red. av Document.no rett før jul om filmen. Red. fremførte samme mening som i omtalen av filmen: Det er ikke spesielt kristent å velge martyrdøden overfor en motstander som ikke respekterer liv. Derfor blir munkenes offer meningsløst. Det redder på ingen måte lokalbefolkningen, slik man håpet.
Men dominikaner Arnfinn Haram identifiserte seg med munkenes valg, og det falt mer i smak hos journalist Kaja Korsvold som valgte utelukkende å gjengi Harams syn. Haram er en multikulturalist, som mener at det verste er å være «kulturell aggressiv», på kristendommen eller Vestens vegne.
Slik presenteres en meningstung film i riktig innpakning, men er det sikkert at det er denne konklusjonen publikum trekker?
De som forsøker å oppdra blir stadig skuffet over resultatet, men de fatter ikke at det er noe annet som folk ser. De ser det ikke selv.
Sarkozy har varslet at han vil ha en debatt om nasjonal identitet, om bønnesamlinger på gaten. Men også i Frankrike er det de samme som deltar i debatten, og resultatet er gitt på forhånd.
But Sarkozy has been wrong-footed by it. You can make the case—many do—that Muslims are praying in the street because they don’t have mosques, and that the French government should do its part to make sure they are able to build them. So Sarkozy has called for a “debate on Islam.” But this has not satisfied his voters. I attended a magazine editorial board meeting in Paris in February and found the editors in agreement that such a debate would do Sarkozy no good. “The only place this ‘debate’ can wind up is with platitudes like ‘Ninety-nine percent of our Muslim fellow-citizens are good Frenchmen,’ and so on,” said one of the editors present. “It cannot wind up making contact with anything real.”
Sarkozy har sagt ting som heller ikke Front National har turt si, om obligatoriske strafferammer og fratagelse av statsborgerskapet. Utløsende var angrep på en politistasjon i Villeneuve, som romaer sto bak. Men denne bakgrunnen ble ikke rapportert av norske medier. Tvertimot. De drev kampanje mot den høyreflørtende Sarkozy og hadde sans for Luxembourgs EU-kommissær som trakk frem jødedeportasjonene.
Selv Bernard Henri-Levy reagerte sterkt på talen i Grenoble.
Last July he spoke in Grenoble after two episodes of ethnic violence. The city had just seen three nights of battles between police and rioters in the neighborhood of Villeneuve, and that came on the heels of an attack on the police station in St-Aignan by 50 Roms, or gypsies, armed with axes.
Sarkozy gave a speech that leapt way beyond the usual boundaries of tough-on-crime rhetoric. “We are suffering the consequences of 50 years of immigration, insufficiently regulated, that have led to a failure of assimilation,” he said. He urged the introduction of mandatory minimum sentences of unheard-of severity—30 years for serious attacks on police. And he called for stripping French citizenship from any newly naturalized citizen convicted of such a crime. Sarkozy’s critics on the left quickly pointed out that denationalizations had not been carried out since the dark days of the middle of the last century. It was the sort of policy which the National Front has repeatedly been accused of secretly favoring, and here Sarkozy was espousing it openly. While Sarkozy’s Grenoble talk may have pleased some voters, it surely left others wondering why there was a taboo on voting FN in the first place.
Caldwell møter Marine Le Pen. Hun er skilt to ganger, har tre barn, og er 42 år.
Venstresiden har henvendt seg til de misfornøyde, men det butter: transportstreiken brakte landet nærmest til stillstand. De gamle metodene fungerer ikke lenger. Det er ikke penger i kassen, og innerst inne vet fagbevegelsen det.
Marine Le Pen har gjort EU til hovedsak. Hun vil melde Frankrike ut.
And that is provided by the European Union. The fact is that, despite the continued enthusiasm for it among their governing classes, the French people have more Europe than they want. In 2005, in an electoral battle as contentious as any in the past half century, a sizable majority voted “no” on a referendum on a new continent-wide constitution. Their reasons may have been varied—some voted no out of nationalism, others out of a conviction that EU membership made France more capitalist than it should be—but their verdict was unambiguous. That majority has been ignored, and much of the constitution was subsequently enacted through the so-called Lisbon Treaty. Clearly, European peoples have lost hold on the levers by which they once held their politicians accountable, and in France, the FN is the only party that speaks squarely for those who are bothered by this development.
Once Europe is identified as the problem, a political program comes into view—one aimed at restoring powers, formal and informal, that have been relocated abroad. Ms. Le Pen likens her movement to the Tea Party. To an extent that would surprise those familiar with the old FN, Ms. Le Pen is comfortable talking about economics. She would withdraw from the European Union and from the euro, which she rejects on the grounds that it is not an “optimal currency area,” in the sense laid out by the economist Robert Mundell. Who can dispute that? Her reading of the austerity plans being imposed on Greece and Ireland is that “they are destroying the peoples to save the currency.”
Caldwell tror at Marine Le Pen er i ferd med gjøre Front National til et nytt stort høyreparti i Europa, som våger det bruddet Sarkozy snakket om, men innenfor akseptable rammer.