Jim Hoagland har lest Richard A. Posners bok, Preventing Surprise Attacks, og har plukket med seg noen innsikter som er verdt å sitere:
Posner, a federal appeals court judge in Chicago, a law professor and a prolific author of books on public policy, makes these points in «Preventing Surprise Attacks,» a bold and welcome antidote to the commission fatigue settling over a Washington awash with reports and congressional hearings on intelligence failure and reform.
And he points to this fundamental flaw in the way the commission was organized: «To combine an investigation of the attacks (the causes, the missed opportunities, and the responses) with recommendations for preventing future attacks is the same mistake as combining intelligence and policy. The means believed available for solving a problem influence how the problem is understood and described.»
This is the policymaker’s equivalent of every problem looking like a nail if you have only a hammer: If bureaucratic reorganization is the only obvious answer, bureaucratic failure had to be the problem from the outset. Ergo, blame the spies for intelligence failure and centralize: Create a director of national intelligence (DNI) and draw a new organization chart for the nation’s overlapping but uncommunicative spy agencies.
Hammering the Wrong NailsThe 9/11 Commission’s ‘Solution’ Won’t Fix the Real Intelligence Failures