Bildet WikiLeaks-rapportene etterlater er av en krig der Taliban bare er en del av trusselen. Det er tusenvis av andre ting som sliter og til sammen gjør det tungt å føre krigen. Selvfølgelig har ikke USAs militære ønsket at alle negative faktorer skal bli kjent.
Den positive siden ved lekkasjene er at de stimulerer til debatt. Det er godt at hjemmepublikummet får et realistisk forhold til krigen. Men WikiLeaks-leder Julian Assange ser ut til å ha en forestilling om at han skal tukte Pentagon og innføre «accountability» i krigen. Det grenser til stormannsgalskap.
Snapshotene som NYTimes ruller opp, er megetsigende.
OCT. 11, 2009 | BALKH PROVINCE
Incident Report: Brutal Police Chief
This report began with an account of Afghan soldiers and police officers harassing and beating local civilians for refusing to cooperate in a search. It then related the story of a district police commander who forced himself on a 16-year-old girl. When a civilian complained, the report continued, “The district commander ordered his bodyguard to open fire on the AC [Afghan civilian]. The bodyguard refused, at which time the district commander shot [the bodyguard] in front of the AC.”
Rivalries and friction between the largest Afghan security services — the police and the army — are evident in a number of reports. Sometimes the tensions erupted in outright clashes, as was recorded in the following report from last December that was described as an “enemy action.” The “enemy” in this case was the Afghan National Security Force.
Norske politikere og eksperter har i årevis snakket om hvor viktig det er å afghanisere krigen. Dokumentene gir mye ammunisjon til de desillusjonerte:
NOV. 22, 2009 | KANDAHAR PROVINCE
Incident Report: Illegal Checkpoint
A private security convoy, ferrying fuel from Kandahar to Oruzgan, was stopped by what was thought to be 100 insurgents armed with assault rifles and PK machine guns, a report said.
It turned out the convoy had been halted by “the local Chief of Police,” who was “demanding $2000-$3000 per truck” as a kind of toll. The chief, said the report, from NATO headquarters in Southern Afghanistan, “states he needs the money to run his operation.”
The chief was not actually a police chief. He was Matiullah Khan, a warlord and an American-backed ally of President Karzai who was arguably Oruzgan’s most powerful man. He had a contract, the Ministry of Interior said, to protect the road so NATO’s supply convoys could drive on it, but he had apparently decided to extort money from the convoys himself.
Late in the day, Mr. Matiullah, after many interventions, changed his mind. The report said that friendly forces “report that the COMPASS convoy is moving again and did not pay the fee required.”
Selv vellykkede hjelpeprosjekter viser seg å være svindel. Afghanere kvier seg ikke for å utnytte barnehjem for foreldreløse – foreldreløse vil si at barna ikke bor hos faren.
The documents show how the best intentions of Americans to help rebuild Afghanistan through provincial reconstruction teams ran up against a bewildering array of problems — from corruption to cultural misunderstandings — as they tried to win over the public by helping repair dams and bridges, build schools and train local authorities.
A series of reports from 2005 to 2008 chart the frustrations of one of the first such teams, assigned to Gardez, in Paktia Province.
NOV. 28, 2006 | PAKTIA PROVINCE
Civil Affairs Report: Orphanage Opens
An American civil affairs officer could barely contain her enthusiasm as she spoke at a ribbon-cutting ceremony for a new orphanage, built with money from the American military.
The officer said a friend had given her a leather jacket to present to “someone special,” the report noted. She chose the orphanage’s director. “The commander stated that she could think of no one more deserving then someone who cared for orphans,” it said.
The civil affairs team handed out blankets, coats, scarves and toys. The governor even gave money from his own pocket. “All speeches were very positive,” the report concluded. Read the Document »
DEC. 20, 2006 | PAKTIA PROVINCE
Civil Affairs Report: Not Many Orphans
The team dropped by to check on the orphanage. “We found very few orphans living there and could not find most of the HA [humanitarian assistance] we had given them,” the report noted.
The team raised the issue with the governor of Paktia, who said he was also concerned and suspected that the money he had donated had not reached the children. He visited the orphanage himself. Only 30 children were there; the director had claimed to have 102. Read the Document »
OCT. 16, 2007 | PAKTIA PROVINCE
Mangel på ressurser
Det finnes afghanere som virkelig ønsker å gjøre en innsats. Men de er utsatt og risikerer både egen og familiens sikkerhet.
District Report: Lack of Resources
As the Taliban insurgency strengthened, the lack of a government presence in the more remote districts — and the government’s inability to provide security or resources even to its own officials — is evident in the reports.
An official from Dand Wa Patan, a small sliver of a district along the border with Pakistan, so urgently wanted to talk to the members of the American team that he traveled three and a half hours by taxi — he had no car — to meet them.
“He explained that the enemy had changed their tactics in the area and were no longer fighting from the mountains, no longer sending rockets toward his compound and other areas,” the report noted. “He stated that the enemy focus was on direct action and that his family was a primary target.”
Ten days earlier the Taliban crept up to the wall of his family compound and blew up one of the security towers, the report said. His son lost his legs in the explosion.
He pleaded for more police officers, weapons and ammunition. He also wanted a car so he could drive around the district he was supposed to oversee.
Etter tre tiår med krig ser Afghanistan ut til å ha kommet inn i en ond sirkel hvor negative krefter overtar. Det er ufattelig å tenke på med hvilken letthet forskere som Kristian Berg Harpviken går inn for en politisk avtale med Taliban. Hva har de å tilby Afghanistan? Det eneste de kan er krig og forbud.
I et slikt miljø forsterkes de negative faktorene. Politisjefen bruker sin stilling til å forfalske personopplysninger for å hente ut mest mulig penger og utstyr til seg selv.
Resultatet er desillusjonering og sinne blant befolkningen. De ser bare korrupsjon.
In one case, provincial council officials visited the Americans at their base in Gardez to report threats — the Taliban had tossed a grenade into their office compound and were prowling the hills. Then the officials began a tirade.
“The people of Afghanistan keep loosing their trust in the government because of the high amount of corrupted government officials,” the report quoted them as saying. “The general view of the Afghans is that the current government is worst than the Taliban.”
“The corrupted government officials are a new concept brought to Afghanistan by the AMERICANS,” the oldest member of the group told the civil affairs team.
In conclusion, the civil affairs officer who wrote the report warned, “The people will support the Anti-Coalition forces and the security condition will degenerate.”
Antikrigsblokken i Europa har i lang tid latterliggjort forsøket på å bringe demokrati til Afghanistan. Det fremstilles som naivt og enfoldig eller som utslag av nykolonialisme. Afghanerne har ikke forutsetninger for demokrati, hevdes det. Men uansett bakgrunn, hvilket folk ønsker å leve under et korrupt styre? Er det noe folk ikke tåler så er det korrupsjon, akkurat denne rettferdighetssansen deles av de aller fleste.
De vestlige landenes problem er at korrupsjonen finnes og blomstrer hos myndighetene som skal være deres partnere og som etter hvert skal overta ansvaret for både krigen og nasjonsbyggingen.
Inntrykket som er skapt de senere år er at slurv, ufølsomhet og hensynsløshet er noe som amerikanerne er alene om og som har utviklet seg de senere år. Men de liberale som holder menneskerettighetene høyt, synes å glemme at deres idealer har gitt en krigføring med et minimum av risiko for egne soldater. Redusert risiko for egne betyr større risiko for andre, dvs. collateral damage. Disse dilemmaene tar liberale sjelden opp.
Vestlige land er så lite vant til tap,at man har problemer med å erkjenne at krig er stygt. Under andre verdenskrig var det mange tilfeller av friendly fire og slurvete ledelse som kostet soldater livet. Den gang var proporsjonene helt andre. Vestlig opinion har problemer med å leve etter en fredsstandard hjemme og samtidig forstå krigens standard ute.