Matthew Engel fra Financial Times har besøkt Malmø. Han finner to oppsiktsvekkende resultater: Malmø er en av de mest segregerte byene i Europa. Om ti år vil flertallet være av utenlandsk avstamning, og med det et muslimsk flertall kort etter.

Samtidig har mange begynt å tvile på den svenske velferdsmodellen. Den er i krise. Kombinasjon av høy innvandring og et godt trygdesystem er uholdbar på lang sikt. Det er en debatt nordmenn kunne lære av.

Unnoticed by the rest of the world, Sweden has changed, and Malmö has changed dramatically to become one of the most racially divided cities in Europe. Already, 37 per cent of the population were either born abroad or had both parents born abroad. Among children, that figure rises to almost half.

The numbers have been somewhat inflated by the other big change to Malmö – the opening of the bridge across the narrow Oresund seven years ago, linking the city to Copenhagen. Many Danes have moved to this side of the strait, attracted by lower property prices.

Even so, Malmö (population 278,000) is now one-quarter Muslim. And that proportion is rising rapidly due to continuing immigration and differential birth rates. Officials accept that most of the inhabitants will be of non-Swedish origin within a decade, and that a Muslim majority could follow soon after that. Like more obvious multi-ethnic places such as Birmingham and Rotterdam, Malmö would be a «majority minority» city. And that does not factor in the possibility of a new Middle Eastern cataclysm (war in Iran? The disintegration of Iraq?) producing a new surge of refugees.

Kollaps?

Engel sier at den svenske modellen holder på å bryte sammen. Det er merkelig at det må en brite til for å fortelle oss det. Norske korrespondenter i Stockholm greier det ikke.

Local and national politicians are struggling to adapt and respond to these rapid changes. But there is a growing acceptance that «the Swedish model» – exceptionally generous welfare policies combined with an exceptionally generous approach to immigration – is now unsustainable. That has been the basis of Sweden’s image abroad, and of its own self-image. And, in a very quiet, very Swedish way, its collapse is likely to be traumatic.

Hvis den svenske modellen bryter sammen, vil det også få konsekvenser for Norge. En slik kursjustering vil neppe gå upåaktet hen. Selv oljeformuen rekker ikke hvis befolkningssammensetningen blir for skjev, som NHO har påvist uten at det ga særlig ekko.

Malmø er segregert, men det er den peneste ghettoen i Europa, skriver Engel. Området skiller seg ikke stort fra Medel-Svensons boligområder. Men arbeidsledigheten er skyhøy: 82 prosent i boligområdet Herrgarden. Engel sammenligner med banlieus utenfor Paris og de verste områdene i London, men synes å bagatellisere problemene når han skriver at 150 drar inn til sentrum for å drive litt «light mugging» i helgene.

In Herrgarden, kids from diverse backgrounds do mix. But at schools composed almost wholly of migrants, they find it hard to feel an attachment with wider society. «My passport says I’m Svensk, but in the apartment, no,» says Lulli’s Turkish pal Nihad. «In Herrgarden, if someone has a problem, we help him. The Swedes, they are very cold. They shake hands. We kiss. Not like gays, like brothers.»

Fuelled by resentment against native Swedes, some go into town on a Friday or Saturday night to indulge in a little light mugging of what they call «the Svens». The police think only about 150 youths are involved. At least these youngsters speak Swedish. For their parents, it can be much harder. Cushioned by social security but imprisoned by linguistic inadequacy, many of the unemployed hardly go out. The migrants are here physically, but many have not made the mental leap.

Folkhem

Svenskene ville bli moralske verdensmestre etter krigen og ville bygge folkhemmet, skriver Engel. Sverige skulle bli en åpen havn for alle forfulgte. Men nå har venstresiden oppdaget at folkhemmet forutsetter nasjonalisme, skriver Engel.

Yet there is an increasing sense, even on the left, that the combination of Sweden’s welfare and migration policies was foredoomed. The «Swedish model», often seen as a middle way between communism and capitalism, dates back to the 1930s. The intellectual roots of the policy lie in the concept of folkhem («people’s home»); scholars have noticed its similarity to the interwar German idea of Volksgemeinschaft («people’s community»). One turned malignant, one did not, but they were grown in similar cultures.

Nick Johnson of Britain’s Institute of Community Cohesion has studied race relations in various multicultural cities. «In both Sweden and Denmark,» he says, «it was very striking that people on the left were saying they hadn’t realised the extent to which their social model was predicated on a strong sense of nationalism. And diversity was starting to open the debate about the kind of society they want.

«Some were thinking that they can only maintain strong support for individuals if they control their borders. They are now facing the problem the UK has wrestled with for years: that of having a permanent ethnic minority underclass.»

Men likevel fortsetter Sverige å ta imot. Det virker som om politikken er blitt selvdrevet. Politikere og myndigheter viser tegn til panikk.

Jämfört med 2006 mer än fördubblades antalet asylsökande irakier i Sverige i fjol, till 18 559. I år väntas 17 000-18 000 irakiska asylsökande komma och snittiden för en asylutredning i fjol var dryga sju månader.

Migrationsverket vil starte et prosjekt der 5.000 irakere skal hurtiggranskes: På ti dager skal søknaden behandles. Prosjektet koster 32 millioner og betales av EU. De sakene man ikke greier avgjøre, vil bli sendt over i den vanlige køen som normalt tar sju måneder.

The new face of Sweden