Hvorfor er amerikanere fra Mars og europeere fra Venus? Var det noe morsomt Robert Kagan fant på? At europeere har fått økende avsmak for vold vet vi. Forsvarsmakten er bygget systematisk ned etter at Muren falt.
Men hvor dypt stikker forskjellen? Walter Russel Mead mener amerikanere har en helt annen oppfatning av krig enn europeere, og det går helt tilbake til kampen for uavhengighet fra Storbritannia, mens europeiske bønder ikke var spesielt opptatt av å slåss for sine fyrster.
At den amerikanske frigjøringskrig var en citizen-krig gjør at amerikanere tenker seg selv inn i situasjoner: man gjør det som skal til for å vinne. Amerikanerne førte en ganske dirty krig mot britene. Det går en rød tråd herfra til general Shermans invasjon av Sørstatene, og teppebombingen av tyske byer: i en cititzen-krig er sivilbefolkningens stridsmoral en faktor det gjelder å knekke.
Dette totalkonsept av krig gjør at amerikanerne ikke har noe problem med å forstå israelernes reaksjon på rakettene fra Gaza. De ville gjort det samme.
Dette er et perspektiv som er så fjernt fra europeernes at det er vel verdt å studere. Det ser helt bort fra proporsjonalitet som er europeernes og det internasjonale samfunns målestokk. Fordi Israel er overlegen skal det slåss ikke minst én arm på ryggen. Staten har ikke lov å benytte sin fulle makt. Det er umoralsk. De døde skal telles mot døde, slik norske medier daglig gjør et stort nummer av, for å legge et stort moralsk press på Israel.
Når gjør dette neppe særlig stort inntrykk på Israel, hvis Hamas fortsetter å spille om hele innsatsen; alt eller intet. Men journalistene tror det selv. Jørgen Lohne skriver i Aftenposten i dag at
Oppmerksomheten om Dalou-familiens ufattelige tragedie kan komme til å gi kravene om en snarlig våpenhvile større vekt.
Man bør nok ikke snakke til israelere om «ufattelige tragedier», de vet godt hva det er. De vet også hva en trussel vil si og kjenner den igjen. Hvis noen forsøker å overtale dem til å gi seg, vil de ikke lytte. Det ville heller ikke vi hvis livet sto på spill.
Mer grunnleggende er Lohne og kollegers tro på at en menneskelig tragedie som utraderingen av en familie kan påvirke krigens gang. Da tror journalistene på sin egen propaganda. Tror de virkelig at krig er et spill som lar seg påvirke så lett?
I bunnen ligger illusjoner om hva krig er, også den krigen de står midt oppe i, for Hamas viser sannelig ikke noe at den sans for menneskelig tragedie og følsomhet som Lohne etterlyser og åpenbart tror på. Derfor er det en viss bitter ironi at han forventer at dette skal gjøre inntrykk på Israel. Lohne forstår ikke at han blottlegger sine egne holdninger.
Blar man om ser man bildet av et utbombet Homs. Bildet er en illustrasjon til et intervju med Kofi Annan. Men bildet sier mer enn Annans ord. Byen ser ut som et månelandskap. Slik Hamas gjorde i 1982. Denne virkeligheten er noe alle som lever i Midtøsten kjenner. Men norske journaliser har i de siste 40 år gjort lite eller ingenting for å fortelle publikum om hva slags regler som gjelder. I stedet har de hisset publikum opp fordi Israel ikke oppfører seg som det ligger i Europa.
Når nå de sosiale endringene i Europa fører til høyere konfliktnivå vil kanskje forståelsen for Israel bli større. Det må være Lohne, Tveit, Waage, Smilden, Mikkelsens store skrekk. Publikum vil gjenkjenne Israels konflikt og uttrykke forståelse for at den ikke lar seg løse ved dialog.
Walter Russel Mead sier amerikanerne har erfart at massiv overvekt for å løse problemet er mer humant i det lange løp enn stadig gjentakende kriger.
Hamas håper åpenbart å teste Israels nerver. Mye kan gå galt for Israel down the road, men foreløpig har Hamas spilt sine kort slik at amerikanerne gir Israel grønt lys. Stikk i strid med den stemningen norske journalister forsøker å piske opp.
Avstanden mellom Europa og USA blir større, også over Israel. Det verste er at vi ikke forstår amerikanerne, men anser dem for dumme, forvokste, umodne, triggerhappy og en drøss andre sterotyper. Det er aldri oss selv det er noe galt med.
As Israeli airstrikes and naval shells bombarded Gaza this weekend, the world asked the question that perennially frustrates, confuses and enrages so many people across the planet: Why aren’t the Americans hating on Israel more?
As in Operation Cast Lead, the last big conflict between Israel and Hamas, and as during the operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon, much of the world screams in outrage while America yawns. If anything, many of Israel’s military operations are more popular and less controversial in the United States than they are in Israel itself. This time around, President Barack Obama and his administration have issued one statement after another in support of Israel’s right to self defense, and both houses of Congress have passed resolutions in support of Jerusalem’s response.
Commentators around the world grasp at straws in seeking to explain what’s going on. Islamophobia and racism, say some. Americans just don’t care about Arab deaths and they are so blinded by their fear of Islam that they can’t see the simple realities of the conflict on the ground. Others allege that a sinister Jewish lobby controls the media and the political system through vast power of Jewish money; the poor ignorant Americans are the helpless pawns of clever Jews. Still others suggest that it is fanatical fundamentalists with their carry on flight bags packed for the Rapture who are behind American blindness to Israel’s crimes.
America is a big country with a lot of things going on, but the real force driving American support for Israeli actions in Gaza isn’t Islamophobia, Jewish conspiracies or foam-flecked religious nuts. It’s something much simpler: many though not all Americans look at war through a distinctive cultural lens. Readers of Special Providence know that I’ve written about four schools of American thinking about world affairs; from the perspective of the most widespread of them, the Jacksonians, what Israel is doing in Gaza makes perfect sense. Not only are many Jacksonians completely untroubled by Israel’s response to the rocket attacks in Gaza, many genuinely don’t understand why the rest of the world is so steamed about Israel—and so angry with the United States.
Americans as a people have never much believed in fighting by “the rules.” The Minutemen who fought the British regulars at Lexington and Concord in 1776 thought that there was nothing stupider in the world than to stand in even ranks and brightly colored uniforms waiting to shoot and be shot like gentlemen. They hid behind stone walls and trees, wearing clothes that blended in with their surroundings, and took potshots at the British wherever they could. George Washington saved the Revolution by a surprise attack on British forces the night before Christmas; far from being ashamed of an attack no European general of the day would have countenanced, Americans turned a painting of the attack (“Washington Crossing the Delaware”) into a patriotic icon. In America, war is not a sport.
Theoreticians of “just war” say that in order for war to be justifiable, two tests must be met. You have to have a legitimate cause for war (self defense, for example, rather than grabbing land from a weaker neighbor) and you must fight the war in the right way. You must fight fair (that is, fight a just war), and you must fight nice.
One of the criteria for jus in bello (fighting nice as opposed to jus ad bellum which is about whether it is just ) is proportionality. If the other guy comes at you with a stick, you can’t pull a knife. If he’s got a knife, you can’t pull a gun. If he burned your barn, you can’t nuke his capital. Your use of force must be proportionate to the cause and to the danger.
Israel’s fiercer critics attack it for fighting unjust wars against the Palestinians. For some, Zionism itself is an illegitimate idea and a state that has no right to exist has no right to defend itself. Anything it does to defend itself is a crime. This is how Hamas and many others think and it is why people in this camp are able to work themselves up into such a froth of indignation and rage when Israel responds to their fire.
For others, Israel may have a right to exist, but its occupation of the West Bank and other crimes against the Palestinians have deprived it of a just grounds for war when Palestinians attack it. People in this camp attack any use of force by Israel as lacking jus ad bellum, basically because they think Israel has forfeited its jus by its occupation and settlement policy. This is where a lot of the non-Muslim European left comes out and it is why they are so quick to attack Israel for a war which, after all, was triggered by rockets from Gaza landing in Israel.
But more moderate critics of Israel (including many Israelis) focus on jus in bello, and in particular they look at the question of proportionality. When the Palestinians flick a handful of fairly crude rockets at random across Israel, these critics say, Israel has a right to a kind of pinprick response: tit for tat. But it isn’t entitled to bring the full power of its industrial grade air force and its mighty ground forces into an operation designed to crush Hamas at the cost of hundreds of civilian casualties. You can’t fight slingshots with tanks.
For many people around the world, this seems patently obvious: Israel has a right to respond to attacks from Hamas but it doesn’t have an unlimited right to respond to limited attacks with unlimited force. Israeli blindness to this obvious moral principle strikes many observers as evidence of hardheartedness and national moral decline, and colors their perceptions of many other Israeli policies.
The whole jus in bello argument sails right over the heads of most Americans. The proportionality concept never went over that big here. Many Americans are instinctive Clausewitzians; Clausewitz argued that efforts to make war less cruel end up making it worse, and a lot of Americans agree. [UPDATED NOTE: Many Americans consider the classic concept of proportionality — that the violence used must be proportional to the end sought — as meaningless when responding to attacks on the lives of citizens because the protection of citizens from armed and planned attacks is of enough importance to justify any steps taken to ensure that the attacks end.]
From this perspective, the kind of tit-for-tat limited warfare that the advocates of just and proportionate warfare would require is a recipe for unending war: for decades of random air strikes, bombs and other raids. An endless war of limited intensity is worse, many Americans instinctively feel, than a time-limited war of unlimited ferocity. A crushing blow that brings an end to the war—like General Sherman’s march of destruction through the Confederacy in 1864-65—is ultimately kinder even to the vanquished than an endless state of desultory war.
The European just war tradition springs in part from the reality that historically in Europe war was an affair of kings and rulers that hurt the little people without doing anything for them. Peasants really didn’t care whether the Duke of Burgundy or the Count of Anjou was recognized as the rightful overlord of their village, and moralists and theologians worked to limit the violence that the dukes and the counts and their henchmen wreaked on the poor peasants caught up in a quarrel that wasn’t theirs.
With no feudal past in this country, Americans have tended to see wars as wars of peoples rather than wars of elites and in a war of peoples the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate targets tends to collapse. The German civilian (male or female) making weapons for Hitler’s Wehrmacht was as much a part of the enemy’s warmaking potential as the soldier at the front. Furthermore, in a war of peoples in which civilians are implicated in the conflict, the health and morale of the civilian population is a legitimate target of war. This justified the blockades against the Confederacy and against Germany and German occupied Europe during the world wars, and it also justified the mass terror bombing raids of World War Two in which the destruction of enemy morale was one of the stated aims.
This is the same logic by which someone like Osama bin Laden could justify his attacks on civilians at the World Trade Center, and it is the fundamental logic behind Hamas’ indiscriminate attacks on Israeli civilian targets. Americans don’t like it when their enemies use this kind of logic, but it is a type of warfare they understand and they have fought and won enough of these wars in the past to be ready if necessary to do it again.
From this perspective, in which war is an elemental struggle between peoples rather than a kind of knightly duel between courtly elites, the concept of proportionality seems much less compelling. Certainly if some kind of terrorist organization were to set up missile factories across the frontier in Canada and Mexico and start attacking targets in the United States, the American people would demand that their President use all necessary force without stint or limit until the resistance had been completely, utterly and pitilessly crushed. Those Americans who share this view of war might feel sorrow at the loss of innocent life, of the children and non-combatants killed when overwhelming American power was used to take the terrorists out, but they would feel no moral guilt. The guilt would be on the shoulders of those who started the whole thing by launching the missiles.
Thus when television cameras show the bodies of children killed in an Israeli air raid, Jacksonian Americans are sorry about the loss of life, but it inspires them to hate and loathe Hamas more, rather than to be mad at Israel. They blame the irresponsible dolts who started the war for all the consequences of the war and they admire Israel’s strength and its resolve for dealing with the appalling blood lust of the unhinged loons who start a war they can’t win, and then cower behind the corpses of the children their foolishness has killed. The whole situation strengthens the widespread American belief that Palestinian hate rather than Israeli intransigence is the fundamental reason for the Middle East impasse, and the television pictures that drive much of the world away from Israel often have the effect of strengthening the bonds between Americans and the Jewish state.
This automatic Jacksonian response to the Middle East situation overlooks some important complexities in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and in the past America’s Jacksonian instincts have gotten us into trouble. But anyone trying to analyze the politics of the Middle East struggle as they unfold in American debates needs to be aware of the power of these ideas about war in American life.
In any case, when Israel brings the big guns and fast planes against Gaza’s popguns and low tech missiles, a great many Americans see nothing but common sense at work. These Americans aren’t mad about ‘disproportionate’ Israeli violence in Gaza because they don’t really accept the concept of proportionality in war. They think that if you have jus ad bellum, and rocket strikes from Gaza are definitely that, you get something close to a blank check when it comes to jus in bello.
If anything, rather than weakening American sympathy for Israel, Israel’s response in Gaza (and the global criticism that surrounds it) is likely to strengthen the bonds of respect and esteem that many Americans feel for Israelis. Far from seeing Israel’s use of overwhelming force against limited provocation as harsh or immoral, many Americans see it as courageous and wise. It strengthens the sense that in a wacky world where a lot of foreigners are hard to understand, the Israelis are honest, competent and reliable friends — good people to have on your side in a tight spot.