I vestlige medier gjøres det et nummer av at Egypt ikke har noen ayatollah Khomeini som står klar til å kidnappe revolusjonen. Glemmer de Yusuf Qaradawi?

Nettopp mangelen på politiske ledere gjør at Qaradawi kan få stor innflytelse.

Det er forunderlig at ikke mediene har reflektert over hvilken betydning en av den islamske verdens mest innflytelelsesrike TV-personligheter kan få. Ikke minst siden Qaradawi er den åndelige leder for Brorskapet.

Lee Smith skriver om dette i The Tablet:

Assertions that the Muslim Brotherhood and its leadership are too disorganized and uncharismatic to gain a hold on power in Egypt unaccountably ignore the world’s most popular and authoritative Sunni cleric—an Egyptian by birth and member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood whose son currently lives in Egypt. Where the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who led the Iranian revolution, made radio broadcasts in exile from Paris, Qaradawi hosts one of the region’s most famous talk-shows on Al Jazeera, Sharia and Life. Qaradawi has cultivated among some American analysts a reputation for moderation with his fatwas, permitting masturbation and condemning Sept. 11 (while supporting suicide bombers in Israel). But in the Middle East his popularity resides in his stringent criticism of Arab regimes. His public support for violence, combined with the fact that he is a principal shareholder in and adviser to the al-Qaida-associated Bank al-Taqwa in Switzerland, led to him being banned from entering the United States in 1999 and from Great Britain in 2008.

What makes Qaradawi most worth watching is the fact that the Egyptian party system is badly decayed, and no credible opposition figures have stepped up to fill the gap. Mohammed ElBaradei is entirely a creation of Western opinion leaders and has no constituency in Egypt. Amr Moussa has some popular appeal, but his job as general secretary of the Arab League is not a position that showcases an ability to get things done. Moreover, as Mubarak’s former foreign minister he has deep ties to the old regime. The local Muslim Brotherhood was slow out of the gate, and its 68-year-old leader, Muhammad Badie, is not exactly charismatic.

As a media personality with a presence on TV and the Internet—and who is far out of reach of Egyptian internal security and free from Egyptian censors—Qaradawi is perfectly positioned to play the role of Muslim Brotherhood publicist or even kingmaker over the coming months. Nor is there any particular reason to think that Qaradawi’s willingness to embrace facets of modernity while promoting violence and hatred makes him less than dangerous to the dream of a future liberal society in Egypt and to Western interests in the region. The idea that Qaradawi is a moderate because he favors a relatively liberal interpretation of the status of women within Islam, for example, disregards his belief that homosexuality is a crime that should be punished by death and his embrace of the Holocaust as a divine punishment of the Jews that will hopefully be repeated soon.

Uttalelsene om at Holocaust var Allahs straffedom, og at Qaradawi håpet et nytt Holocaust ville bli utført av muslimene, blir neppe glemt med det første.

Det sies at egypterne ikke vil stemme for et islamistisk parti. Men det samme sa man om palestinerne i sin tid. Det het at de var sekulære og opplyste. Det forhindret dem ikke i å stemme for Hamas.

I Libanon har 30 prosent av de kristne stemt for Hizbollah.

Regjeringspartiet i Egypt, NPD, er kraftig svekket, og vil ikke kunne by Brorskapet på konkurranse med det første.

Brorskapet har røtter som går langt tilbake, helt tilbake til Napoleons erobring av Egypt i 1798.

Of course, many foreign and Egyptian observers contend that Egyptians, a moderate people by nature, don’t want anything like the Iranian regime running their country. That may be true, but the only real evidence we have, aside from questionable polling, suggests something different. After all, supposedly secular and moderate Palestinian voters were not impressed with the regional failure of Islamist politics—they voted for Hamas, the Gaza branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Or consider Lebanon, where at least 30 percent of the Christian community has aligned itself with the Khomeinist project in their country via Christian leader Michel Aoun’s alliance with Hezbollah. Presumably Middle Eastern Christians are among the last people who want to live under an Islamist regime, but what they fear and despise most now is the country’s Sunni community. That is to say, there are many reasons that people might choose to go with an Islamist party, many—but not all of which—are irrational. Mubarak’s departure will almost inevitably leave the ruling National Democratic Party’s organizational structure in shambles, which means that the best-organized political party in Egypt will be the Brotherhood.

Qaradawi representerer Brorskapets moderne islam: som omfavner moderne teknologi, men fyller dem med et salafistisk innhold.

Nettopp Brorskapets sterke stilling blant høyt utdannede innen realfag som kjemi, biologi, ingeniører, teknikere, medisin, jus, gjør at de står sterkt rustet til kampen om makten.

Jewel of the Nile
Yussuf al-Qaradawi, the world’s most popular and authoritative Sunni cleric, is a Muslim Brotherhood-aligned Egyptian based in Qatar. A return to his home country would be dangerous for Israel and the West.

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