Vesten har vært preget av ønsketenkning om Brorskapet og nekter å gi slipp på illusjonene. Da er det fremtidshåpet som brister. Men er det noe alternativ til realisme?

Eric Trager er spesialist på Brorskapet. Han forteller at det var upopulært å kritisere dem da den arabiske våren sto på som sterkest:

Despite the brazenness of the Brotherhood’s undemocratic practices and outlook, however, many within the American policy community gave the Brotherhood the benefit of the doubt. This was particularly the case following Mubarak’s ouster, when Arab Spring optimism dissuaded too many analysts from taking a discerning look at Egypt’s newly emerging leaders. Rather than going through a laundry list of those who called it wrong, I offer the following e-mail I received from an editor shortly after the revolution, responding to my proposed article critiquing the Brotherhood:

Be forewarned that people may be hostile to your conclusion—there is an understandable sentimental attachment to the Egyptian Revolution and an equally understandable fear in US discourse of letting Islamophobia color our impression of the MB. Of course I know your writing on the MB to be objective and fair, but just keep in mind that there will be an especially high burden of proof here.

There was, in other words, the prevalent view that the Muslim Brotherhood was a contributor to Egypt’s democratic awakening, and that those who attacked it were cranks of either the anti-Muslim or pro-autocratic variety. The notion that one might oppose the Brotherhood preciselybecause of his hope for Egyptian democratization was entirely lost in these kinds of exchanges.

Trager beskriver oppbyggingen, rekruttering, opplæring, ledelsesstruktur og hvordan Brorskapet tenker om demokrati.

That’s because the very process through which one becomes a Muslim Brother is designed to weed out moderates. It begins when specially designated Brotherhood recruiters, who work at mosques and universities across Egypt, identify pious young men and begin engaging them in social activities to assess their suitability for the organization. The Brotherhood’s ideological brainwashing begins a few months later, as new recruits are incorporated into Brotherhood cells (known as “families”) and introduced to the organization’s curriculum, which emphasizes Qur’anic memorization and the writings of founder Hassan al-Banna, among others. Then, over a five-to-eight-year period, a team of three senior Muslim Brothers monitors each recruit as he advances through five different ranks of Brotherhood membership—muhib, muayyad, muntasib,muntazim, and finally ach amal, or “active brother.”

Throughout this process, rising Muslim Brothers are continually vetted for their embrace of the Brotherhood’s ideology, commitment to its cause, and—most importantly—willingness to follow orders from the Brotherhood’s senior leadership. As a result, Muslim Brothers come to see themselves as foot soldiers in service of the organization’s theocratic credo: “Allah is our objective; the Quran is our law; the Prophet is our leader; Jihad is our way; and death for the sake of Allah is the highest of our aspirations.” Meanwhile, those dissenting with the organization’s aims or tactics are eliminated at various stages during the five-to-eight-year vetting period.

Slagordet kan minne om nazistenes: Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer. Det er mye blod og offer i Brorskapets teologi.

USA har trodd det går an å føre dialog med Brorskapet. Den illusjonen bør de snarest kvitte seg med. Brorskapet er teokratisk.

Washington ought to have known by now that “democratic dialogue” is virtually impossible with the Muslim Brotherhood, which is now mobilizing throughout Egypt to defend Morsi’s edict. The reason is that it is not a “democratic party” at all. Rather, it is a cultish organization that was never likely to moderate once it had grasped power.

Syn på demokratiet

Moreover, despite its participation in elections, the Brotherhood views formally democratic institutions as means to an end, rather than as sacred in and of themselves. The Brotherhood was perhaps most candid in 2005, when it declared on its official website, “If democracy means that people decide who leads them, then [we] accept it; if it means that people can change the laws of Allah and follow what they wish to follow, then it is not acceptable.” But the Brotherhood’s undemocratic outlook was more openly on display this past June when, in the run-up to the announcement of the presidential elections results, Muslim Brothers occupied Tahrir Square and—at the orders of their leaders—declared themselves ready to fight if Morsi was not named the winner.

Ymter om borgerkrig

Brorskapets respons er aldri å rygge eller gi etter. Det er å angripe og stå på sitt. Det er alltid de andres feil.

Morsi’s second power-grab in five months, however, has laid bare the mutual exclusivity between the Muslim Brotherhood and democracy. Indeed, as the first protests mounted against his edict, Morsi responded by encouraging confrontation rather than compromise, declaring his opponents “weevils eating away at the nation of Egypt.” Brotherhood youths echoed Morsi,calling for “cleansing” the country of Morsi’s top critics, including Nobel Laureate Mohamed ElBaradei and former presidential candidates Amr Moussa and Hamdeen Sabahi. Meanwhile, prominent Muslim Brothers have advocated violence to defend their president. In this vein, senior Brotherhood adviser Gehad El-Haddad tweeted on Saturday that, “When future of Egypt is in balance, … we are more than wiling to pay for it with our lives not votes.” Even more ominously, following the death of a Brotherhood youth in clashes on Sunday, Saad El-Shater—the son of a top Brotherhood leader—accused Morsi’s opponents of starting a “civil war,” and warned that “the Brotherhood has a surplus of manhood.”

 

Artikkelen sto i the New Republic

http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/110447/why-did-anyone-ever-believe-mohammad-morsi-was-moderate#