Christian Skaug Artikkelen the Runaway General har to temaer: McChrystal som person, som er interessant nok. Han er beviset på at USA er individualismens land. Slektskapet til Clint Eastwood, Bruce Willis, John Wayne er tydelig: USA lar individet få spillerom, slik at ting blir gjort, ikke bare på papiret. Dette ligger i ryggmargen på USA som nasjon.
Det er også grunnlaget for myteindustrien Hollywood. USAs helter er verdens helter.
McChrystal er en real time helt, ikke på duken, men han kommer sikkert dit også.
USA er i krig og trenger mennesker som kan ordne opp. Gjør ikke Europa det også? Kontrasten til Europa er stor når man leser om McChrystal: Europa foretrakk fredsdividende, og et stort land som Tyskland vil ikke ofre blod i Afghanistan. Hvilken betydning får det for en nasjons indre moral, for evnen til å ordne opp på hjemmebane? Europeiske land står foran store problemer, også med potensiell sivil uro.
McChrystal kommer fra en familie hvor det militære ligger i blodet. Han gikk på West Point rett etter Vietnam, da hærens anseelse var på et lavmål.
Growing up as a military brat, McChrystal exhibited the mixture of brilliance and cockiness that would follow him throughout his career. His father fought in Korea and Vietnam, retiring as a two-star general, and his four brothers all joined the armed services. Moving around to different bases, McChrystal took solace in baseball, a sport in which he made no pretense of hiding his superiority: In Little League, he would call out strikes to the crowd before whipping a fastball down the middle.
McChrystal entered West Point in 1972, when the U.S. military was close to its all-time low in popularity. His class was the last to graduate before the academy started to admit women. The «Prison on the Hudson,» as it was known then, was a potent mix of testosterone, hooliganism and reactionary patriotism. Cadets repeatedly trashed the mess hall in food fights, and birthdays were celebrated with a tradition called «rat fucking,» which often left the birthday boy outside in the snow or mud, covered in shaving cream. «It was pretty out of control,» says Lt. Gen. David Barno, a classmate who went on to serve as the top commander in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005. The class, filled with what Barno calls «huge talent» and «wild-eyed teenagers with a strong sense of idealism,» also produced Gen. Ray Odierno, the current commander of U.S. forces in Iraq.
The son of a general, McChrystal was also a ringleader of the campus dissidents – a dual role that taught him how to thrive in a rigid, top-down environment while thumbing his nose at authority every chance he got. He accumulated more than 100 hours of demerits for drinking, partying and insubordination – a record that his classmates boasted made him a «century man.» One classmate, who asked not to be named, recalls finding McChrystal passed out in the shower after downing a case of beer he had hidden under the sink. The troublemaking almost got him kicked out, and he spent hours subjected to forced marches in the Area, a paved courtyard where unruly cadets were disciplined. «I’d come visit, and I’d end up spending most of my time in the library, while Stan was in the Area,» recalls Annie, who began dating McChrystal in 1973.
McChrystal kom ut som nummer 298 av 834 avgangselever, en dårlig score for en så begavet mann.
Han ble leder, først for spesialsoldatene Rangers. Allerede her utmerket han seg ved sine evner til å skjære gjennom og gjøre systemer mer effektive, noe som bla. betød å heve kravene:
Displaying a penchant for transforming systems he considers outdated, McChrystal set out to revolutionize the training regime for the Rangers. He introduced mixed martial arts, required every soldier to qualify with night-vision goggles on the rifle range and forced troops to build up their endurance with weekly marches involving heavy backpacks.
Han avanserte til leder av kommandosentralen for spesialstyrkene, Rangers, Navy Seals, Delta – som står for USAs hemmelige operasjoner og de har det vært mange av siden 9/11 og Irak/Afghanistan. Spesialstyrkene er blitt en egen og mektig gren innen militæret. Det er de som får ting gjort. Etter 9/11 sto USA i en helt ny situasjon, overfor en helt ny type fiende. USA var på utkikk etter nye svar, her kom en ukonvensjonell fyr som McChrystal til sin rett.
But as he moved up through the ranks, McChrystal relied on the skills he had learned as a troublemaking kid at West Point: knowing precisely how far he could go in a rigid military hierarchy without getting tossed out. Being a highly intelligent badass, he discovered, could take you far – especially in the political chaos that followed September 11th. «He was very focused,» says Annie. «Even as a young officer he seemed to know what he wanted to do. I don’t think his personality has changed in all these years.»
(Annie er kona, som ser ham en måned i året)
Men can-do-holdningen betød at man ikke bare tøyet grensene, Bush-administrasjonen var elastisk på dette punkt, man brøt også internasjonale regler som USA var forpliktet av.
Konkret var McChrystal innblandet i to hendelser som normalt burde ha sinket karrieren. En sportsstjerne, Pat Tillmann, ble drept av sine egne i Afghanistan i 2004. Det ble satt i gang en systematisk dekkoperasjon som la skylden på Taliban. McChrystal godkjente operasjonen, men skyldte senere på at han ikke hadde lest papirene grundig nok.
Verre var innblandingen i fangeleiren Nama i Irak, der fangene ble utsatt for den røffe behandlingen som Donald Rumsfeld hadde godkjent, og som grenset til tortur.
Two years later, in 2006, McChrystal was tainted by a scandal involving detainee abuse and torture at Camp Nama in Iraq. According to a report by Human Rights Watch, prisoners at the camp were subjected to a now-familiar litany of abuse: stress positions, being dragged naked through the mud. McChrystal was not disciplined in the scandal, even though an interrogator at the camp reported seeing him inspect the prison multiple times. But the experience was so unsettling to McChrystal that he tried to prevent detainee operations from being placed under his command in Afghanistan, viewing them as a «political swamp,» according to a U.S. official. In May 2009, as McChrystal prepared for his confirmation hearings, his staff prepared him for hard questions about Camp Nama and the Tillman cover-up. But the scandals barely made a ripple in Congress, and McChrystal was soon on his way back to Kabul to run the war in Afghanistan.
McChrystal levde opp til gamle forestillinger om generalen som deler soldatenes kår og utsetter seg for fare. Historiene om hans spartanske stil er blitt mytedannende. At han sover fire timer, spiser ett måltid per dag og begynner dagen med å løpe én mil. David Petraeus er også kjent for utholdenhet og stayerevne.
Men McChrystal er mer action-orientert. Han utsetter seg for fare, og drar ut til der mest utsatte og gudsforlatte utposter, med et lite følge.
«The fucking lads love Stan McChrystal,» says a British officer who serves in Kabul. «You’d be out in Somewhere, Iraq, and someone would take a knee beside you, and a corporal would be like ‘Who the fuck is that?’ And it’s fucking Stan McChrystal.»
Krigen
Det viktigste ved Hastings artikkel er likevel det han forteller om krigens gang. McChrystal var sentral i utarbeidelsen av counterinsurgency-metodikken: soldatene skulle ut og patruljere og skaffe seg befolkningens tillit. Men strategien har hatt en pris: Nye rules of engagement.
Det er ikke McChrystal som har skrevet dem. De kommer fra byråkratiet i Pentagon. Omsatt i praksis betyr det en rekke begrensninger i soldatenes handlefrihet. Hensynet til sivile kommer først. Men når man ikke kan se forskjell på sivile og Taliban betyr det stundom at soldater må bøte med livet. Sivile man mistenker for å være Taliban blir løslatt hvis de er uten våpen.
Et forlatt hus kunne ikke rives, det gjorde det lettere for Taliban å plassere en veibombe som drepte en soldat. Konkrete tilfeller som dette skaper stor misnøye og frustrasjon blant soldatene.
Dette er ikke regler McChrystal har skapt, men han må leve med dem, og soldatene blir demotiverte.
But however strategic they may be, McChrystal’s new marching orders have caused an intense backlash among his own troops. Being told to hold their fire, soldiers complain, puts them in greater danger. «Bottom line?» says a former Special Forces operator who has spent years in Iraq and Afghanistan. «I would love to kick McChrystal in the nuts. His rules of engagement put soldiers’ lives in even greater danger. Every real soldier will tell you the same thing.»
In March, McChrystal traveled to Combat Outpost JFM – a small encampment on the outskirts of Kandahar – to confront such accusations from the troops directly. It was a typically bold move by the general. Only two days earlier, he had received an e-mail from Israel Arroyo, a 25-year-old staff sergeant who asked McChrystal to go on a mission with his unit. «I am writing because it was said you don’t care about the troops and have made it harder to defend ourselves,» Arroyo wrote.
Within hours, McChrystal responded personally: «I’m saddened by the accusation that I don’t care about soldiers, as it is something I suspect any soldier takes both personally and professionally – at least I do. But I know perceptions depend upon your perspective at the time, and I respect that every soldier’s view is his own.» Then he showed up at Arroyo’s outpost and went on a foot patrol with the troops – not some bullshit photo-op stroll through a market, but a real live operation in a dangerous war zone.
Six weeks later, just before McChrystal returned from Paris, the general received another e-mail from Arroyo. A 23-year-old corporal named Michael Ingram – one of the soldiers McChrystal had gone on patrol with – had been killed by an IED a day earlier. It was the third man the 25-member platoon had lost in a year, and Arroyo was writing to see if the general would attend Ingram’s memorial service. «He started to look up to you,» Arroyo wrote. McChrystal said he would try to make it down to pay his respects as soon as possible.
I internettalderen går slike historier rundt til alle soldatene. De diskuterer. Betyr sivil sikkerhet at de må ofre seg? En umulig situasjon.
McChrystal besøkte utposten og snakket med soldatene. Stemningen var ikke god. Han greide ikke overbevise dem, for han har ikke handlingsrom, han kan ikke forandre reglene.
The night before the general is scheduled to visit Sgt. Arroyo’s platoon for the memorial, I arrive at Combat Outpost JFM to speak with the soldiers he had gone on patrol with. JFM is a small encampment, ringed by high blast walls and guard towers. Almost all of the soldiers here have been on repeated combat tours in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and have seen some of the worst fighting of both wars. But they are especially angered by Ingram’s death. His commanders had repeatedly requested permission to tear down the house where Ingram was killed, noting that it was often used as a combat position by the Taliban. But due to McChrystal’s new restrictions to avoid upsetting civilians, the request had been denied. «These were abandoned houses,» fumes Staff Sgt. Kennith Hicks. «Nobody was coming back to live in them.»
One soldier shows me the list of new regulations the platoon was given. «Patrol only in areas that you are reasonably certain that you will not have to defend yourselves with lethal force,» the laminated card reads. For a soldier who has traveled halfway around the world to fight, that’s like telling a cop he should only patrol in areas where he knows he won’t have to make arrests. «Does that make any fucking sense?» asks Pfc. Jared Pautsch. «We should just drop a fucking bomb on this place. You sit and ask yourself: What are we doing here?»
The rules handed out here are not what McChrystal intended – they’ve been distorted as they passed through the chain of command – but knowing that does nothing to lessen the anger of troops on the ground. «Fuck, when I came over here and heard that McChrystal was in charge, I thought we would get our fucking gun on,» says Hicks, who has served three tours of combat. «I get COIN. I get all that. McChrystal comes here, explains it, it makes sense. But then he goes away on his bird, and by the time his directives get passed down to us through Big Army, they’re all fucked up – either because somebody is trying to cover their ass, or because they just don’t understand it themselves. But we’re fucking losing this thing.»
McChrystal and his team show up the next day. Underneath a tent, the general has a 45-minute discussion with some two dozen soldiers. The atmosphere is tense. «I ask you what’s going on in your world, and I think it’s important for you all to understand the big picture as well,» McChrystal begins. «How’s the company doing? You guys feeling sorry for yourselves? Anybody? Anybody feel like you’re losing?» McChrystal says.
«Sir, some of the guys here, sir, think we’re losing, sir,» says Hicks.
McChrystal nods. «Strength is leading when you just don’t want to lead,» he tells the men. «You’re leading by example. That’s what we do. Particularly when it’s really, really hard, and it hurts inside.» Then he spends 20 minutes talking about counterinsurgency, diagramming his concepts and principles on a whiteboard. He makes COIN seem like common sense, but he’s careful not to bullshit the men. «We are knee-deep in the decisive year,» he tells them. The Taliban, he insists, no longer has the initiative – «but I don’t think we do, either.» It’s similar to the talk he gave in Paris, but it’s not winning any hearts and minds among the soldiers. «This is the philosophical part that works with think tanks,» McChrystal tries to joke. «But it doesn’t get the same reception from infantry companies.»
During the question-and-answer period, the frustration boils over. The soldiers complain about not being allowed to use lethal force, about watching insurgents they detain be freed for lack of evidence. They want to be able to fight – like they did in Iraq, like they had in Afghanistan before McChrystal. «We aren’t putting fear into the Taliban,» one soldier says.
«Winning hearts and minds in COIN is a coldblooded thing,» McChrystal says, citing an oft-repeated maxim that you can’t kill your way out of Afghanistan. «The Russians killed 1 million Afghans, and that didn’t work.»
«I’m not saying go out and kill everybody, sir,» the soldier persists. «You say we’ve stopped the momentum of the insurgency. I don’t believe that’s true in this area. The more we pull back, the more we restrain ourselves, the stronger it’s getting.»
«I agree with you,» McChrystal says. «In this area, we’ve not made progress, probably. You have to show strength here, you have to use fire. What I’m telling you is, fire costs you. What do you want to do? You want to wipe the population out here and resettle it?»
A soldier complains that under the rules, any insurgent who doesn’t have a weapon is immediately assumed to be a civilian. «That’s the way this game is,» McChrystal says. «It’s complex. I can’t just decide: It’s shirts and skins, and we’ll kill all the shirts.»
As the discussion ends, McChrystal seems to sense that he hasn’t succeeded at easing the men’s anger. He makes one last-ditch effort to reach them, acknowledging the death of Cpl. Ingram. «There’s no way I can make that easier,» he tells them. «No way I can pretend it won’t hurt. No way I can tell you not to feel that. . . . I will tell you, you’re doing a great job. Don’t let the frustration get to you.» The session ends with no clapping, and no real resolution. McChrystal may have sold President Obama on counterinsurgency, but many of his own men aren’t buying it.
Denne diskusjonen er mye viktigere enn at McChrystal og hans team driter ut Richard Holbrooke, ambassadør Karl Eikenberry, visepresident Biden eller sikkerhetsrådgiver Jim Jones.
Problemene består etter at McChrystal er skiftet ut. Norske kommentatorer roter det til og skriver at Holbrooke blandet seg inn og ødela samspillet med Hamid Karzai. Alt tyder på at Peter Galbraith hadde rett: Karzai er ubrukelig. Han dekker over sin egen inkompetanse og regjeringens korrupsjon ved å spille på antiamerikanisme.
Eide og ekspertmiljøet med Kristian Berg Harpviken i spissen snakker hele tiden om behovet for afghanisering, når utviklingen viser at Karzai-regjeringen ikke er oppgaven voksen.
Det er nok riktig som Hastings skriver at de militære spiller en så stor rolle at de har kunnet fylle også den diplomatiske rollen. De skal drive nasjonsbygging, samtidig som det føres krig. Løsningen på en slik konflikt er ikke å gå inn for mindre krig, og mer sivil gjenoppbygging. Det er ikke penger Afghanistan mangler, skriver Hastings. Tvertimot. McChrystal pøser inn 90 millioner dollar i Kandahar i sivil gjenoppbygging, men så mye penger går til korrupsjon. Det finnes ikke noe apparat som kan bruke dem fornuftig.
Hastings representerer en liberal synsvinkel som har bestemt seg: USA kan ikke vinne, og som ser etter bevis for å underbygge sin påstand.
Fritjof Jacobsen skriver i VG og ser ikke ut til å forstå at Talibans form for asymmetrisk krigføring er annerledes enn mujahedins mot sovjeterne. Taliban spekulerer i terrorens logikk, det gjorde ikke mujahedin på samme måte. Det var en motstandsbevegelse i den mer klassiske betydning av ordet, som måtte ha befolkningens tillit. Taliban derimot styrer gjennom frykt. Sivile betaler prisen, og vender sin frustrasjon og vrede mot ISAF.
Det er ingen enkle svar, aller minst når regjeringen i Kabul ikke er oppgaven voksen.
The most striking example of McChrystal’s usurpation of diplomatic policy is his handling of Karzai. It is McChrystal, not diplomats like Eikenberry or Holbrooke, who enjoys the best relationship with the man America is relying on to lead Afghanistan. The doctrine of counterinsurgency requires a credible government, and since Karzai is not considered credible by his own people, McChrystal has worked hard to make him so. Over the past few months, he has accompanied the president on more than 10 trips around the country, standing beside him at political meetings, or shuras, in Kandahar. In February, the day before the doomed offensive in Marja, McChrystal even drove over to the president’s palace to get him to sign off on what would be the largest military operation of the year. Karzai’s staff, however, insisted that the president was sleeping off a cold and could not be disturbed. After several hours of haggling, McChrystal finally enlisted the aid of Afghanistan’s defense minister, who persuaded Karzai’s people to wake the president from his nap.
This is one of the central flaws with McChrystal’s counterinsurgency strategy: The need to build a credible government puts us at the mercy of whatever tin-pot leader we’ve backed – a danger that Eikenberry explicitly warned about in his cable. Even Team McChrystal privately acknowledges that Karzai is a less-than-ideal partner. «He’s been locked up in his palace the past year,» laments one of the general’s top advisers. At times, Karzai himself has actively undermined McChrystal’s desire to put him in charge. During a recent visit to Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Karzai met three U.S. soldiers who had been wounded in Uruzgan province. «General,» he called out to McChrystal, «I didn’t even know we were fighting in Uruzgan!»
Det er merkelig hvor lunkne de norske kommentarene er. Afghanistan er også vår krig, men det høres ikke slik ut. Den beskrives som USAs problem, og man inntar tilskuerens rolle.
Det er ikke holdbart.
