Hans Rustad Diskusjonen om moderate og radikale krefter i Teheran skygger for at Iran har ført en konsekvent radikal, undergravende politikk helt siden revolusjonen. Irak har gitt dem sjansen til å spille poker i stort format. Britene er maktesløse uten at et samlet EU iverksetter økonomisk blokade. Alternativet er krig eller et Iran med atomvåpen.
Tim Hames i the Times mener kommentatorer studerer seg bort i intriger og maktspill i Teheran. Det er viktigere å se på det som har vært konstant: de mål som forfølges og metodene som brukes. Iran har aldri latt seg temme. Selv under Rafsanjani og Khatami fortsatte den indre undertrykkelsen: under Rafsanjani drev paramilitære med uteonomrettslige henrettelser av landets fremste kulturskikkelser. Under Khatami ble studentprotester druknet i blod. Khatami gikk ikke av i protest. Han er nå ventet til Norge som Kjell Magne Bondeviks venn.
Flere prominente iranere er etterlyst av Interpol for terrorbombene mot det jødiske samfunnshuset i Buenos Aires på 90-tallet. Det er ikke lenge siden etterlysningen sto i avisene. men det blir ignorert. Slik er regimets ansikt. Det er i samme ånd de har tatt 15 briter som gisler og tvinger dem til å stå frem med tilståelser på TV.
There is endless discussion about how to separate the «moderates» from the «radicals» in Tehran. It is a largely futile exercise. The blunt reality is that Iran has been a menace from the moment that Jimmy Carter, with monumental weakness, decided to force the Shah into exile and so permit Ayatollah Khomeni to return from Paris to assume control. Iran has sought to destabilise the Middle East peace process, undercut Lebanon’s sovereignty and undermine other regimes in the region for almost 30 years. It has done so while men lauded as «moderates» were state president. The Iranian regime has been the embodiment of theological Trotskyism: permanent revolution is the core of its collective ideology. So why are we surprised that it has taken this chance to treat British citizens so badly?
And what has been the response of most of the major powers throughout this period? It has been to express occasional disapproval while building up trade links. Even after the emergence of the firebrand Mahmoud Ahmadinejad it has been business as usual. Over the past five years Iran has moved step by step to be in a position where it can possess nuclear weapons. It has met only limited resistance from a UN Security Council unwilling to do anything more than threaten minor economic sanctions. Iran has concluded, rationally from its perspective, that no one will challenge its attempt to dominate its neighbourhood. The presence of British troops there is an inconvenience. So why are we surprised that it has engineered the opportunity to intimidate them?
What will happen after this incident is over? Iran has every reason to assume that Britain will be more careful about where its forces are stationed. Any place in the vicinity of what could be regarded as Iranian territorial waters may quietly become out of bounds — which means that it will fall under de facto Iranian authority irrespective of cartography. The Iraqi Navy has less muscle than the Swiss one. It cannot impose itself on these awkward straits.
If Tehran calculates that the best way to push the British out of Basra is by turning up the heat, then that is what it will do — or else it might lie low if it concludes that this will hasten our departure. It will then ease into the vacuum. As it does, the smaller Gulf states, especially, will ask themselves whether it may be wiser to appease the Iranian monster rather than oppose its adventurism. So why are we surprised at such aggression against us?
The lasting lessons of this saga should be obvious. They are that Iran in the hands of the mullahs is not, as has been claimed in the past week, «erratic», «incoherent» or «unpredictable», but consistent in its outlook and objectives. They are that there will be no stability in the most potentially explosive part of the planet while this regime is permitted to operate as it has been doing. They are that the only plausible middle course between the unattractive choice of backing a military endeavour against Iran or accepting that Iran will have the Bomb is an economic blockade on a scale far larger than France or Germany, never mind Russia and China, have been ready to contemplate. That resolve, though, is essential. For if this is what Iran is already like, what on earth will happen if it ever commands nuclear weapons?
